Janez Šušteršič, Meet Reality

Reality seems to have caught up quite fast with finance minister Janez Šušteršič. The man who headed the government macroeconomic office (the aptly named IMAD) during the first Janša administration and refused to pick up the pieces after Jože P. Damijan, the would-be wonder boy of Janša 1.0 jumped ship after only 91 days in office, was forced to fork out EUR 381 million to recapitalise Slovenia‘s largest bank, the state-owned NLB.


Janez Šušteršič and NLB (source & source)

Well, to be honest, the state directly recapitalised the bank with EUR 320 million, while the remainder was coughed up by para-state funds KAD and SOD which is almost the same as if the state gave the money, only it looks better on the balace sheet. KAD and SOD entered the clusterfuck that is the NLB at the eleventh hour, after Belgian KBC bank refused to partake in the operation (after initially agreeing to the deal) and has thus seen its share in NLB shrink from 25 to 22 percent. The funny thing is that only months Šušteršič claimed that not a single euro from the budget will be used to recapitalise NLB. Which means the realisation that no-one will touch NLB with a ten-foot-pole must have come as a rude shock to our austerity-oriented finance minister.

In fact, given the ferocity with which Šušteršič and the rest of the sell-them-all-market-will-know-its-own gang were championing the “market approach” means that what we have witnessed vis-a-vis the NLB was nothing less than an about-face of epic proportions. In other countries, ministers get heavy flak for much less.

OK, fact of the matter is that NLB at this time is about as attractive as three-day-old road-kill and Šušteršič was basically looking down the barrel of a gun, faced with either pumping cash into NLB or hanging it dry. And we’ve seen what letting a bank go bust does, right? But there’s more: Not only did NLB need 380+ million of Tier 1 capital, it also has about three billion of bad loans on its books. And while Šušteršič maintains that most of these loans can and will be repaid, that is more or less eyewash. The bank will never see this money returned, because there is no way for companies who took out these loans (by far and large during the first Janša tenure, when the government encouraged expansionary economic policies) to return them. They don’t have anything to return them with. No competitiveness, no markets, no income, no way to pay the labour force, not even state contracts to offset the above and – finally – no earnings to finance their erstwhile debts.

So, yes, NLB will probably have to suck up losses of about three billion euro. Or about 8,5 percent of entire Slovenian GDP. That’s a lot. And that’s just the biggest bank. Other banks have bad loans on their books as well. Thus the finance minsiter and his boss, the prime minister can assure the country and the world, until they’re blue in the face, that Slovenia will not ask for a bailout of its banks. But the reality is that there will be a call made to Brussels sooner rather than later.

And if the U-turn on NLB recapitalisation wasn’t reason enough, the moment this country asks for a bailout will also be the moment when finance minister Janez Šušteršič will have to ask himself whether he’s fit to continue in this government. In other words: a request for a bailout should be accompanied by a letter of resignation.

The reason for this is painfully simple. Šušteršič positions on the issue, indeed his entire economic platform was about removing the state as a majority owner in key companies. This plan fell apart on the first rock it hit. Yes, NLB needed to be recapitalised and yes, the state is not necessarily a bad owner (although NLB was mismanaged time and again by politically appointed management). Having a the biggest bank in the system limp forward is preferable to letting it sink. But Šušteršič’s political positions which won him the mandate as an elected official, are in direct and blatant opposition with his actions. The two can hardly be reconciled which means that Sloveinan finance minister has a huge credibility problem. And a finance minister with a credibility problem is not something to be looked kindly upon. Just ask Franci Križanič.

But Šuštešič’s biggest problem is not his (lack of) credibility, but the fact that he is, unbeknownst to him, probably earmarked as the fall guy if things go badly wrong. This, at least, would appear to be case since Positive Slovenia announced it will start interpelation proceedings against the finance minister. Technically, an interpelation does not have to end with a vote on minister’s dismissal (although it often does). Instead, it is an instrument of ministerial accountability per se, forcing the minister to explain and defend his or her action.

Now, PM Janez Janša already called starting interpelation this early in the term “nonsense” and at least technically backed Šušteršič up (again, a lovely case of double standards as his party filed an interpelation against Katarina Kresal less then three months after she took office in 2009). But since DL and SDS found themselves on opposite sides on quite a number of issues in the past few days (mostly stemming from the “red star issue”) Šušteršič can be sure that he’ll be made to pick up at least part of the tab.

It seems that the finance minister started this term knowing what his priorities are and falsely assumed that these are other people’s priorities as well (we’ll neglect that these priorities are dubious at best). When challenged about past economic policies of coalition parties in a recent interview with Mladina weekly, Šušteršič answered that he doesn’t care about who did what in the past but is rather interested in what this government will do. And this is the gist of it.

Šušteršič naively assumes that somehow it’ll be different this time around. He really should know better than that. The prime minister is the same. Most of the coalition parties are the same. Most of the key players are the same. Even the problems are the same. How then could results be any different? Remember: I’m not saying that either state or private ownership are inherently bad or good. But the speed at which stated goals of this government and its financial minister have disappeared into thin air is somewhat breathtaking.

 

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Lunatics Have Taken Over The Asylum

Once upon a time in a land far away
lived a monster, who one day woke up
and screamed: Where the fuck am I living!?
(adapted from a jingle by Radio Študent)


Interior minister Gorenak (source, author unknown)

More Google translate, this time a post by the minister of the interior Vinko Gorenak (SDS) who despite last week’s ruling by the European Court on Human Rights continues to deny that the Erased in fact exist, calling them “so called erased” and maintains that most of the 25.000 are just trying to cash in on the situation and that those few who have indeed been wronged should have their rights restored based on case-by-case evaluation. He also says that this restitution would include material compensation. Which is weird, since the position of his party has long been that the Erased are not entitled to any sort of compensation and in 2009 SDS even put forward a constitutional amendment to that effect. I guess he didn’t get the memo.

However, bad grammar aside, he apparently was in the loop when the latest talking points were being distributed. As of a couple of days ago, the line that SDS and (presumably) NSi are taking is that the only problem in town are compensation claims and that the whole thing is to be blamed on the political left wing. Translation: because Gorenak’s predecessor Katarina Kresal went about fixing what (among others) the Slovenian constitutional court told the state to fix long ago, it is now the left wing’s fault that state will have to fork out some money.

Further to that point, Gorenak repeats what his party boss Janez Janša said days ago, namely that despite the finality of the verdict the state doesn’t have enough money to cover its basic needs, let alone compensate “people who were sitting on the fence, while those who might have been wronged should be looked at individually, all the while keeping in mind the state’s financial situation“. Meaning that after everything else is paid for, the victims of the single largest violation of human rights in the history of democratic Slovenia will get what’s left. After having been screened for “traitors, malingerers and speculators”, of course. In other words, minister of the interior, whose portfolio since recently also includes state prosecution, publicly stated he just doesn’t give a fuck about a ruling of the European court of human rights. And nothing happens. Really, where the fuck am I living?!

Obviously, this perverted attitude towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law does not end there. As the state just reduced pension benefits granted mostly to retired WWII war veterans, policemen, judges and so on, and some 25,000 people (funny, how numbers keep repeating) saw their pension reduced by as much as 20% it is probably only a matter of days until some bright soul in the government spins this as if the Erased are to blame. As in: “no wonder we have to reduce pensions as we have to pay huge compensations to people who sympathised with the occupator, and you can thank the left wing and Katarina Kresal for it.

So, let’s get the story straight (again). When the erasure happened (26 February 1992) the government was run by PM Lojze Peterle (Christian Democrats). His government was comprised of every single political party from both sides of the spectrum save the liberal ZSMS which was later renamed in transformed into LDS (and then split into Zares and LDS). And while Igor Bavčar, lately of Istrabenz fame and Janez Janša’s war buddy was indeed the interior minister at the time of the erasure, he was nowhere near being a member of LDS. Back then he was a member of Democratic party, one of two parties created after SDZ (one of the first parties in Slovenia) broke up. No LDS, no Milan Kučan, no Janez Drnovšek and certainly no Katarina Kresal. This is not about whether the left or the right wing is to blame. The Republic of Slovenia is to blame.

When Janez Janša, Vinko Gorenak and the rest of the current administration came to power six months ago swore to “uphold the constitutional order, act according to my conscience and that I shall do all in my power for the good of Slovenia“.

If this the above is how Gorenak et al. perceive constitutional order, the good of this country and if that is what their conscience dictates, then the lunatics have truly taken over the asylum.

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The Erased: Either Pay Up Or Close The Shop

While the world watches in amazement at how the USA yet again managed to do the right thing at the right time and saw their Supreme Court uphold the Obamacare, this sorry little excuse for a country has seen a right thing done. But, sadly, others had to do it for us.


(source)

Namely, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (that is to say, on the appellate level) on Tuesday ruled in the case of Kurić et al. vs Slovenia. The eihgt plaintiffs were among the 25.000 Erased and the court ruled that six of them are entitled to EUR 20,000 compensation for “non-material damages”. Furthermore, the court instructed Slovenia to set up a compensation scheme for everyone who was unlawfully stricken from the “permanent resident database” in 1992 within a year lest the court will award damages for all remaining individuals. With this, twenty years almost to a day, a final chapter in what is arguably the single largest violation of human rights in the democratic history of this country is being written.

Symbolic damages

The damages awarded are symbolic at best. 20k euros may seem a lot, especially if received as a lump sum. But think of it this way. It took more than ten years (and numerous decisions by the Slovene constitutional court, most of which were simply ignored) for this country to recognise that “administrative removal” was legally and morally wrong. As the government of Tone Rop was nearing sunset, interior minister Rado Bohinc made a half-hearted attempt at solving the issue, but got nowhere, because he wanted to both have the cake (fix the status of the Erased) and eat it (keep face, minimize the number of people eligible and appease the right-wing). It didn’t work. The law in question was put to a referendum, where it was summarily struck down on the back of a fiercely xenophobic campaign. Little wonder, as it was an election year.

It took five or six more years for the government of Borut Pahor – specifically, interior minister Katarina Kresal – to really start righting the wrong. And she did. With plenty of help from her state secretary Goran Klemenčič (now head of the anti-corruption commission) and, ultimately, by the landmark decision of the constitutional court to refuse another referendum on the issue in 2010.

And today, after twenty years of being denied “official existence”, not being able to get a work permit, be eligible for health- and pension-insurance, these people (for we are talking about human beings) are awarded 20,000 euros. Thousand euros per year. Or about as much as your average MP makes in a week. So yes, the damages are purely symbolic.

That, however, did not prevent most of the right wing to cry murder. Even more: at first they denied the issue, then claimed that these people were “aggressors, members and sympathisers of the JNA who were erased and serve them right” (rings a bell, no) and finally, when the reality of what had been done to these people was too ominous to ignore, they wanted to pre-emptively prevent them being liable for compensation. Again, a familiar tactic.

Might as well close the shop

Which is why it came as no surprise (but was still appalling to watch) as PM Janez Janša yesterday said this country does not have the funds to compensate the Erased. It is absolutely degrading and distasteful to think of human rights in terms of whether or not one can afford them. If we can not, or – even worse – if human rights are extended only to those who can afford them, then something really is rotten in the state of Slovenia. For no country is worthy of its name if it can not come to (financial) terms with the fact that human rights of a specific group of individuals were systematically trampled on for two decades all the while the country in question claimed to respect and uphold the basic principle of respecting fellow man.

True, there are many cases of people having to go through living hell even today. Workers whose social security was not being paid by the companies they work(ed) for. People, who have to wait ages to have their cases ruled upon or even heard at a court of law. Roma people. Single parents. The LGBT community. You name them. But the case of the Erased stands out due to the systematic approach this country took when making them a “non-entity” and by the collective (governmental) denial of the act happening in the first place.

On the other hand, there is a special para-state fund this country has which has a stake in many a state-owned company and was established specifically with the aim of making money to compensate victims of other persecutions, be it by the Socialist regime, civilian victims or war violence or those whose property was nationalised after WWII whose claims to compensation the state in principle recognised to be valid.

PM Janša said that he has no idea how Slovenia will pay for the damages as it hasn’t got enough money to cover its basic needs. Well, here’s a newsflash. Human rights are a basic need of people living in a democratic society. Simple as that. Otherwise we might as well close the shop and call it quits.

 

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How Danilo Türk Just Won The Presidential Elections (Tomaž Majer Strikes Again)

Despite everything, Slovenia made it through another year, celebrating its 21st anniversary yesterday. Well, “celebrating” might be pushing it a bit. Perhaps “being force-fed psychotic delusions of mentally challenged individuals chasing ghosts of their own pasts” might be a more accurate approximation. Allow me to elucidate with refferences to specifics.


Statehood Day ceremony last Friday (photo: Office of the President/Daniel Novaković/STA)

Every so otften a debate ensues on whether a militay parade should be held in honour of the nation’s independence. You know: tanks, infantry, Alpine troops, naval units, helicopter and jet (or, rather, turbo-prop) fly-bys, the whole nine yards. And every single time, the idea is tossed right out the window, for it is usually supported only by hardline nationalists and those elements of mainstream politics who hope to score cheap political points by waving flags as the troops march. Luckily, thusfar none have been in great demand.

That is not to say, however, that Slovenia has a history of pacifism. The latter was one of the bases of the civil society boom of the 80’s which ultimately brought about democracy. But even though it was openly discussed (and with some gusto on both pros and cons), the idea never really stood a chance. What it did, however, was establish a clear division between the military, the government and the society.

The JNA

In the old country, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was everywhere. And I mean every-fucking-where. Conscripts were visiting elemntary schools saying what a blast it was to serve in the JNA and that only the lucky ones got to serve in the navy or in the air force. JNA had its own Party structure, pre-declared seats in various representative bodies, special access to decision-makers on republic and federal level and was for all intents and purposes considered a constiutuent element of Yugoslav society (insofar such an entity existed in the first place). As a result the Army was omnipresent and seemingly omnipotent. If anyone ever tried to challenge its position, the brass and the entire elite with it shouted treason, pointed to all the way back to 1941 and the Partisans fighting Fasicst and Nazi occupators, shot back with charges of counterrevolution and that was more or less the end of it. If you were lucky, that is. The unlucky ones found themselves publicly humiliated, without a job, thrown in jail or otherwise persecuted, depending on the  state the system was in at that exact moment. Bottom line: the world started in 1941, the Communist party was there to bring it about and woe be unto anyone who sayeth otherwise.

Fast forward to 1991 and the Slovenian war for independence which made the debate on pacifisim once again purely academic. Nevertheless the principle of unconditional civilian control of the armed forces was implemented, the army was confined to the barracks and by switching to a professional rather than a conscscript army, solidering became a job and not every man’s initiation into adulthood. In adition, parades were frowned upon, the history of warfare this nation had to endure instead being represented by the Guard of honour doing trick with rifles (the kind they probably teach in Marines prep school), the occasional fly-by of the entire Slovenian air force (it really doesn’t last long) and ensigns of various armed formations which have one way or another fought for the Slovenian cause at various periods in the nation’s history. And thus we finally get to the gist of it.

The Friday Clusterfuck

In preprarations for this year’s official celebrations, ensigns of the Partisan Army in World War II were, for the first time in the history in Slovenia not included in the official celebrations on Statehood Day. The official explanation was that they are bearing red stars, a symbol of the aggressor JNA which sought to quash the fledgling state on that fateful 25 June 1991. An uproar followed but the government committee in charge of these things reacted not by extending the invitation to the WWII Veterans Association post haste, but rather by retracting invitations already extended to three other veteran organisations: TIGR (a pre-WWII anti-fascist movement in Primorska region), The General Rudolf Maister Association (preserving the heritage of a Slovenian general largely credited by securing Slovenian northern border right after World War I and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire) and – most perverse of all – the Disabled Veterans Association. As an act of solidarity, Sever Association (policemen who fought in the Independence War) refused to take part in Friday’s celebrations as well.

All hell broke loose and Friday’s events are still the talk of the town. It soon became apparent that the red star had precious little to do with anything. Instead, what really happened was an attempt at hi-jacking the history of this country (hat tip to the good doctor), making it look as if the world started in 1991 and that everything that went before that was a bad dream at best and that modern-day Slovenia has nothing to do with it. Which is not unlike what the JNA was doing for all those years. The fact that the incumbent prime minister was once a true believer (expelled from the Party for being too radical) only strengthens the point.

Quite a few good analyses of the entire event were given in the past few days (in Slovenian, I’m afraid), but then Prime Minister Janez Janša finally made a statement on the issue earlier today, saying that “his only mistake was to have asked President Danilo Türk to deliver the address”. Thus two things became apparent. That a) Janša had a bigger role in this clusterfuck than it seemed at first and – connected – b) that despite the ideologically charged debate the whole thing was more or less aimed at discrediting President Türk who is up for re-election later this year.

Tomaž Majer Strikes Again

In the days following the elections on December 4, when things still looked as if Zoran Janković was about to form a government, a highly bigotous and xenophobic write-up appeared on SDS website claiming electoral fraud and coercion brought Janković on top on election day, mostly “due to people with foreign accents wearing track-suits”. You can read the Google translation of the said post. It is still on the party website and is highly illuminating.

The post was undersigned by one Tomaž Majer, which turned out to be a fictitious person. Almost immediately conspiracy theories were floated that the post was actually written by Janša himself during one of his rambling fits. It is hardly the first one (again, Google translate to the rescue). But although ugly, pengovsky never wrote it up because it all seemed too convenient.

Saying that Janez Janša is Tomaž Majer is in fact just a mechanism to single out one individual who – regardless of the fact that he is the big Kahuna of his party – can hardly come up with all of that shit. Sure, some of it. Even most of it. But running a party, running a campaign, fighting criminal charges, having a family, eating, sleeping, talking and coming up with stuff way beyond lunatic all the while keeping a composed, somber and lucid appearance is hardly possible. Either that or I seriously need to be taken to his dealer.

No. Pengovsky submits that “Tomaž Majer” is in fact a group of like-minded individuals (present PM included) whose reality only intermittently intersects with that of the rest of the country and who are not beyond starting a fully-charged ideological debate shouting-match for the sole purpose of achieving short-term political goals, not giving a fuck about poisoning the atmosphere in the country or indeed making sure that it remains as poisonous as possible. The only problem is that in their zeal to drive the message home the whole thing explodes right into their faces. Therefore, this thing with ensigns of WWII veterans was nothing more than a ploy to have Danilo Türk say something inflammatory on Friday and then beat him to political death with it come Autumn. Rewriting history was just a “bonus for the troops”, so that the rank-and-file believers would have something to shout about.

But as per usual, the whole thing exploded right into Janša’s face, presenting President Türk with a chance to reach beyond these artificial divisions, being all presidential and stuff. The Prez did not waste the opportunity.

As if shooting themselves in the knee once wasn’t enough, the people responsible for the event (by his own admission this included Janša) had the moderator deliver an on-stage statement, saying that “memories of those fallen for independent Slovenia should not be defiled by symbols of the aggressor army. At the risk of repeating oneself: as if the world started in 1991 and everything before that was just a bad dream at best.

Backfire

That the political left-wing went apeshit, goes without saying. Even the chronically consensual Borut Pahor said that “such events should be about bringing people together, not driving them apart”. What is more, this particular potato became too hot even for most of the parties of the ruling coalition. Karl Erjavec, facing leadership challenges in DeSUS was quick to threaten with quitting the coalition “if it ever happened again” (meaning he doesn’t have to make good on his word for at least another year) and even Radovan Žerjav of centre-right SLS said that the whole issue was counter-productive and called for the government to apologise to those involved. Most curious, however, was the reaction of Gregor Virant of Citizens’ list who issued a statement saying that “someone appropriated the celebrations”, that the whole thing was a solo action of Janez Janša’s SDS and that the whole thing “was almost totalitarian”. In fact, it was only the Christian-democratic NSi which stood by the SDS, but they have a hard-on for anything even remotely resembling communism so that was to be expected.

So, yes, celebrations of this country’s birth were hi-jacked by those who deem themselves sole interpreters of The Truth. In this, they are no different from the aggressor army which sought to kill Slovenian state in its infancy (and for some time before that). But the real insult to the people of this land is not the fact that they attempted it (yet again), but rather that they went at it for the sole purpose of winning what for all intents and purposes is a prestigious political fight.

If recent history is anything to go by, Janez Janša will pay a heavy political price for this one. And with him anyone who is too cozy with him. Yes, I’m looking at you, Borut Pahor. In fact, all things being equal, one could place a wager saying that on Friday last Danilo Türk won the autumn presidential elections. Which, ironically, proves Janša right. It was a mistake to have Türk deliver the address…

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Greek Elections: A Europe-wide Non-Event

A couple of random thoughts on the non-event that was the Greek elections last Sunday:


(source via TBIJ)

For all the brouhahaha about Syriza, it turned out that the more things change the more they stay the same. Even in Greece. Sure, the rag-tag coalition of left-wing parties was branded as radical, but it was anything but. As the question du jour was the bailout (which, again, is anything but), the foreign media divided the parties as either pro- or anti-bailout, which most of them translated as “in favour” or “against” the euro and the EU in general. But take a look at this BBC Q&A on Greek elections (scroll all the way to the bottom) to see where the various parties really stand (or, possibly, stood).

Indeed, most of the Europe, nay, the world! held its breath. Some in horror, others (pengovsky included) in anticipation. Had Syriza won, we would have – after five years – seen an end to the “there’s no other way” logic of handling the crisis. Sure, it is quite possible that Syriza would have failed. Indeed, one would not trade places with any European politician in power for all the farms in Cuba. But instead of a coalition whose plan was possibly doomed to failure, Greece is now stuck with a government whose plan does not work as it is. That much we know.

Bailouts EU style don’t work. Or rather, they do, if you’re a German (or any other non-Greek) bank, trying to stay afloat. Out of huge billions of euros sent to Greece in tranches, each of them being subject to “just one more” austerity meausre, most of that goes to service the increasingly bad debts of a country which no one will loan money to, while only a couple of years everyone was positively throwing money at a country known for cooking books.

But those huge billions are not nearly enough, because a) no one knows how deep the hole really is and b) the austerity measures take away what little chance Greece once had to kick-start its economy. Increasing the financial burden imposed on the state and its citizens while cutting public spending and consumption is a text-book vicious circle. It can only end in disaster, much more epic than the one we are in already. Because every new cutting measure is “just one more”. Every billion granted “is just one more”. And every pledge to appease the mythic “forces of market” is “just one more”. Indeed, what fans this fire of euro-crisis is the chronic inability of the few players that have the means to change the direction we’re headed in, to come up with a series of moves bold enough to change the course. Rather than sail into the uncharted waters, European leaders choose to remain in waters infested with economic and financial minefields, even knowing where the mines are, but refusing to change course, because “sooner or later, we’ll be out of this mess”. Well, the sad truth is that by continuing as we do now, the only way out of this minefield is – sinking of the ship.

I’m sure Syriza didn’t have a magic wand to make everything just go away. But they were the guys who looked around and said “why don’t we go that way?”. For that they were branded anti-European, radical leftists, relics of a spend-it-there’s-always-more mentality. Even though everyone else was spending money fast and furious for the last thirty years, even though the (proper) Greek Communist party branded Syriza as agents of capitalism and even though Alexis Tsipras said time and again that he wants Greece to keep the euro, while everyone else is planning to force the country out of the common currency, which would probably mean its exit out of the EU as well.

For about a month, there was a glimmer of hope that a sovereign nation, even though it is on the brink of becoming a European (let’s not use the word German) protectorate, could rise against its self-imposed (financial) masters and try to do it as it sees fit. That hope is gone now, as they voted in a coalition which is nothing more than a PR service for the Bundekanzleramt and is faithfully executing a set of tasks set for them by Berlin Brussels. Which, come to think of it, it not all that different from when Greece was adopting the euro. And if they cheated then, who says they’re not cheating now?

With Greece back in the austerity camp (until it is finally cured by bleeding to death), we’re exactly where we were a month ago and the only hope for this slow-moving train wreck that this the eurozone crisis (via Nouriel Roubini) is the newly minted French president Hollande with his pro-growth stand. But seriously, when was the last time Europe could count on the French to do something about anything?

 

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Not Everybody Gets To Be An Astronaut When They Grow Up (A Few Notes on Borut Pahor)

On Saturday before last former PM Borut Pahor was ousted as president of opposition Social democrats. In what was nominally a four-way race, his only battle-worthy adversary was Igor Lukšič, unofficial party ideologue and until Pahor’s 2008 electoral victory one of his closest allies who eventually prevailed in the second round of the vote, winning by the thinnest of margins. While Pahor won a 180 votes, Lukšič got ten more, ending Pahor’s fifteen years at the party helm. Pengovsky had again things to see and people to do and apologises profoundly to both readers for lack of posting and will try to make amends in the near future. So let’s start with what the near future has in store for Igor Lukšič, Borut Pahor and the Social Democrats.


Igor Lukšič and sour-faced Borut Pahor (Photo: Borut Peterlin/Mladina)

Pahor didn’t try very hard to hide his presidential ambitions. And so he tried to steal the show in Kočevje by announcing his presidential bid right there and then. The trick was that this was not followed by a withdrawal from the race for party president but – it seems – was meant as an ace up his sleeve to secure victory. It almost worked. At the very least, it put the party and its newly minted president into a rather tight spot as Pahor made it no secret that he fully expects the party to back his bid. Sure enough, almost immediately noises were made to that effect both by various local branches as well as Lukšič himself, although the later was careful to acknowledge Pahor’s ambitions but as yet stopped short of backing him. This, apparently, is a matter to be decided upon later this month by the new party leadership.

Igor Lukšič is caught between a rock and a hard place. He ran on a somewhat radical(ish) platform which promised a Hollandesque anti-austerity shift to the left for Social Democrats (where they supposedly belong anyhow) but seems to have taken to heart the tight margin by which he won the contest and interprets it as a call for moderation of his own views which apparently includes backing Pahor lest he risks a party-wide schism. However, supporting Pahor quite probably is just about the only thing he should not be doing. Pengovsky wrote on this a couple of days ago in a different setting and it stirred a little debate on whether it is the right thing to do and whether the SD (which is not in the greatest of shapes, to put it mildly) could actually benefit from Pahor’s bid and possiby even victory in presidential elections. However…

First of all, the notion that the party is somehow indebted to Pahor is utterly misleading. Yes, Pahor did lead it to power, securing the best result ever in 2008 elections. But he also led the party into the single largest routing at the polls, where the voters opened this huge can of whoop-ass on him, cutting the SD down to size from some 30% to a mere 10%. In other words, under Borut Pahor and in the three years that it was in power, the SD lost two thirds of its voters. Not even SLS was hit that hard in 2000 when they went down from 19 to 9 percent. Incidentally, when Pahor took over as party leader fifteen years ago, the SD (then still under the acronym of ZLSD) held about 9 percent in the parliament, meaning that it apparently made a full circle under Pahor and that is was time for him to say goodbye.

Secondly. The notion that Pahor can do wonders for ratings, both of SD in general and of Lukšic specifically, is utterly misleading. One of the few political convetions this country has is that the President, although nominally not prevented from being an active member of a political party (or even its leader), is expected to limit, suspend or completely stop with his party affiliation. With Borut Pahor you can bet your ass that this is the very thing he would have dome were he to become president. He wouldn’t lift a finger to help the SD and not just because the position of the Head of State would require him to do so. The trick is that Pahor’s accross-the-aisle attempts often went above and beyond the call of duty. It’s his trade mark. He did it while he was president of the Parliament, he did it as PM and there’s no reason to believe that he wouldn’t do it as President of the Republic.

Which brings us to the third issue: When Borut Pahor ascended the throne of the PM one of his first moves was to cleanse his inner-party structure, notably kicking out Igor Lukšič, his long-time confidante and party ideologue. In fact, Pahor didn’t even blink. Why on Earth should Lukšič do it any differently? In fact, pengovsky submits that not only should the SD not support Pahor’s bid, it should also try to isolate him in the parliament and remove him from the media spotlight. Namely, if Igor Lukšič fails to do so, he will constantly be second-guessed by SD voters and the general public. What would Borut Pahor do? Oh, there he is, let’s ask him….

Fourth: If Pahor is to remain a permanent fixture in Slovenian politics, there will be no end to second-guessing Igor Lukšič who will have to deal more with the long shadow of Borut Pahor rather than issues that really concern the party. The silhouette of Borut Pahor will haunt him and could very well turn him into a straw-man president with former party president still effectively running the show.

Fifth: Until now Borut Pahor held two of the three highest offices in this country: President of the Parliament and the President of the Government. Becoming the President of the Republic would round it off nicely, no? But the thing is that in both cases Pahor ran on a social democratic platform and as a party leader. Also, in both positions he was overly indulgent to the opposition, drawing much criticism from the party ranks. What in Bob’s name does automatically qualify him to expect support from the political left? Especially since he is actively wooing the right-wing vote (appearing on Catholic radio for an hour long programme, no less).

Six: In the previous presidential elections, the SD supported the incumbent president Danilo Türk. After losing the grip on power and political reality, Borut Pahor started flirting openly with ideas that used to be called Merkozy but now rightly go simply the last name of the German Chancellor. If Pahor were to become the official SD presidential candidate, the party would (again) implicitly subscribe to his views and policies although it had rejected them only ten days ago.

And finally, numero seven: In all honesty, it is somewhat debatable if Pahor would be such a proponent of austerity programmes if the situation were a wee bit different and he didn’t run out of ideas and people who were willing to talk sense into him. And despite his relatively illustrious political carrer, this crisis-handling thing was a gross political miscalculation on his part. It might be just proof enough that Borut Pahor reached the limit of his political prowess and that he is no longer concerned with the public good but rather with keeping his political legacy more or less intact.

Which is why the new SD leadership should think long and hard on whether to support Pahor or not. Pengovsky thinks it’s better for everyone that the support does not materialise. Thus Igor Lukšič would not be haunted by Pahor’s political ghost, the SD would cease being a catering service for Pahor’s political needs and wants while the political left could rally around the incumbent president (who has problems of his own, but that’ll wait for another time).

In short: Bourt Pahor should be made to realise that losing an election and wooing the other side are not the stuff the presidents are made of. It may be hard on him and he may take it badly. But hey, not everybody gets to be an astronaut when they grow up…

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Administrative Reform Packages, pt. 4: On Referendum

Aaaand we’re back. Well, shit is going down and Ljubljana mayor Zoran Janković seems to be in quite a lot of hot water as of today, but we’ll leave that for another day (i.e.: next week), while we take a look at yet another proposal to change the constitution which was floated earlier this week and which is yet another example of systemic changes aimed at “resolving” very specific issues: the legislation on referendums.

What we’re dealing here with is of course a reflex reaction. You’ll remember that moves to change the legal provisions for calling a referendum have been floated before, most notably by the now-non-parliamentary Zares, but this time around the impetus for yet another round of changes to the constitution came as a result of the policemen’s union collection enough signatures to start referendum procedures on the austerity legislation which the Parliament passed about two weeks ago and which more or less cuts public sector expenditures, mostly by reducing the public employees’ pay checks. Given that Slovenian cops are not all that well paid (basic salary of a beat cop reportedly starts at a measly € 860) it it little wonder that the copper’s unions went all out and wanted to call a referendum on the issue. This seemed to have sobered up the ruling coalition which immediately floated the idea of changing the provisions for a referendum and which seems to have gotten the sympathetic ear of the opposition.

The problem is that it’s mostly bollocks.

Namely, this particular attempt at changing the constitution was concocted by none other than the president of the parliament Gregor Virant and provides for some pretty harsh limitations on who can call a referendum and for what purpose. Thus Virant proposes that the referendum procedures can only be initiated by 40.000 votes signing a petition (up from 2500we today), a majority in the parliament (up from a third of MPs,) that the National Council be stripped of the authority to call a referendum and – last but not least – disallowing a referendum on fiscal, monetary and human rights matters. Also, a 40% quorum for the validity of the referendum is proposed. Well, let’s take them apart one at the time:

Disallowing the referendum

Very fancy and in the current political climate where referendums appear to be a dime a dozen also very likeable. However, also mostly ineffective. You see, constitutional provisions all carry the same weight. Sure, there are differences in importance, interpretation and especially execution. For example, Chapter Two of the constitution, covering human rights and personal liberties is executed based directly on the constitution, while numerous other provisions require a legal framework to become effective. But on the whole it is not as if some constitutional provisions are more constitutional than others. Therefore, even if the parliament were to disallow a referendum on certain issues, there’s no guarantee that the said referendum will not be held as the constitutional court will always have to decide if the new constitutional provision is not denigrating some other provision.

Case in point being the idea of “forbidding referendums on human rights”. I’m sure Virant meant well, but it really is bullshit. Referedums on human rights can not be held as it is, I mean, the constitution doesn’t say that anywhere specifically, but since human rights are executed based directly on the constitution, you cannot change or limit them with a mere law. You may very well ask what then of the Family Code (basically a human rights issue), which – as you’ll remember – was defeated on the referendum. Well, take a look at this post. It was about future rights of same sex couples (to form civil unions and adopt children of their partners) against existing rights of petitioners for the referendum (to, well, call a referendum).

Things would be marginally better in case of preventing referendums on financial matters, but – again – such a provision would inevitably be pitted against other constitutional provisions.

Emasculating the National Council

Yes, pengovsky likes the sound of that as well 🙂 In fact, this is not a bad idea, but only a week or so ago Gregor Virant went ga-ga over abolishing the National Council altogether so he really should make up his mind. But taken at face value this is not really such a bad idea. As pengovsky explained in the previous instalment of this primer, the National Council is nothing but a conglomerate of special interest which has precious little to do with popular representation. Hence stripping it of the power to call a referendum is the least that could be done.

Raising the bar for MPs

As things stand now, thirty MPs can call a referendum. A third of the parliament usually (but not necessarily) means MPs of more than one political party, which means at least minimal level of coordination between the parties. Technically, this is an instrument allowing a substantial minority of MPs to force a nation-wide check of the parliamentary majority‘s decision. Raising the bar to a majority of MPs (press reports do not specify whether Virant meant an absolute or relative majority) therefore defies the point. If you can muster a majority of votes to call a referendum, why not simply change the law in question? Or prevent it from being passed in the first place.

This provision does not make sense. In fact, pengovsky suspects that it is only a thinly veiled attempt at stripping MPs of the right to call a referendum as well. Which is wrong. I know it sounds nice and squishy and there isn’t a government in the world which wouldn’t love to have a toothless opposition. But should this provision be adopted it will backfire with a clusterfuck of epic proportions.

The parliament is the representative body of the sovereign, i.e. the people. Therefore it must have all the powers the people have. Including the possibility for a substantial (note the adjective, it will become important later on) minority to call a referendum. In order to avoid the possibility of a tyrannical majority, the minority must have instruments at its disposal. I know these tend to get abused, but if this democracy thing is to work, such instruments simply must be in place. And – truth be told – not all that many referendums were called by the thirty MPs in the first place. Most were called via petitions, most of them party sponsored.

Increasing the required number of signatures on a referendum petition

OK, so the parliament passes a stupid law and the opposition will not or can not do anything about it. What do you do? Start a petition and collect signatures. If you collect enough, the law in question is put on hold while you get your thirty days to collect 40,000 verified signatures, deposited ad one of the 53 administrative units throughout the country. The thing is that to initiate this procedures you only need 2500 non-verified signatures which you can collect anywhere and just present them to the president of the parliament. These signatures are then compared to the national database of residents and if all checks out, you get your thirty days. Easy. In fact, it’s too easy.

Which is why of the entire poppycock proposal this particular provision makes the most sense. Collecting 40.000 signatures is marginally more difficult than getting just 2500 of them. As things stand now, plenty of organisations are rumoured to have these signatures collected “just in case” and use them whenever they see fit. Raising the bar to 40.000 non-verified signatures would alter the game just enough to deter some of the more crackpot referendums we’ve had in the past twenty years.

And while we’re at it, why not raise the number of verified signatures needed as well? I mean, getting 40.000 people to come to the administrative unit, fill out a form, present a proof of identity and submit to a computer check is a lot. But still, it’s only 2,5 percent of eligible voters. Not really a substantial majority, no? Pengovsky sees no harm done if the bar would be raised to 5% or 80.000 verified signatures. Hey, if you want to derail a legislative process, you might as well work hard for it.

Instituting a 40% quorum

And now the trickiest of them all. Virant again floated the idea of quorum for the validity of the referendum. Meaning that the result of a referendum would be valid only if the turnout was at least 40%, the idea being that all the crackpot referendums such as the one on the law on returning monies people invested themselves into building telecommunication infrastructure (don’t ask). Again, this looks very appealing at first sight. But the idea is inherently wrong and could even in the short term do more harm than good. And for four reasons:

One: in a democracy, you’re allowed to vote. In fact, you’re encouraged to do so. Be an active citizen (at least every now and then). But you don’t have to. Your decision not to cast a vote and therefore leave the decision to others is perfectly legitimate. Sure, there are consequences one way or another and it is always better to vote than not to, but you don’t have to. However, by setting up a quorum, people who don’t vote are in a position to passively deny people who do to have their vote count. They are the ones who went to the trouble of casting the vote and if only thirty percent do so. Why should those who choose to remain passive be allowed to decide the fate of the law in question. Why should, in fact, their non-vote count more than the vote of those who actually cast it?

Two: quorum is thought to ensure the legitimacy of the vote. I.e.: if enough people cast their vote, than the legitimacy of the decision is ensured. But why forty percent? Why should a referendum with a 40% turnout be any more legitimate than a referendum with, say 39% turnout? Even more: what if (and this is not an impossible scenario) in a 40% turnout the yes/no vote is split 55/45 and in a 39% turnout the split is 80/20? In the first case, about 375,000 people (the 55%) voted in favour, whereas in the second case as much as 530,000 voted in favour. But under the “quorum rule” the first result is valid while the second is not, although in terms of absolute numbers, many more people voted in favour in the second referendum. OK, so these are hypothetical borderline scenarios, but it is exactly these kinds of situation which test the functionality of any given system.

Three: quorum is suppose to prevent abuse of referendums for political reasons. In fact, it would encourage those very abuses. Namely, more often than not a referendum bid became the tool of last resort aimed at disrupting government policies. Sometimes is enough just to call a referendum to derail or at least severely impede policy making and execution. With a quorum, referendums could be called en masse just to derail a law in question while the petitioners need not really care about the result itself. Enacting a quorum is akin to giving various attention seekers and miscretants a sandbox, inviting them to fool around with the very basics of popular democracy and at the same time insulating them from political, legal or public-opinion consequences, because, hey!, the turnout just wasn’t there. Since the average cost of a referendum held is about four million euro, that’s a pretty expensive sandbox. And who wouldn’t want to play in such a sandbox?

And, finally, four: proponents of the quorum idea say that even the parliament needs a quorum for its vote to be valid. Which is true. Before casting the vote, MPs check in and only then are they able to vote and the vote is only held if more than half of the MPs are present. They can also abstain and still maintain the quorum. But if you want to draw the comparison with popular vote, you soon realise, that the voters are always present, therefore the quorum of the people is always achieved. the moment an inviation to the polling station is sent out the state electoral commission, this the equivalent of the voters checking in and it is for them to decide whether they vote yes or no or whether they’ll abstain.

Get rid of it. Expeditiously.

Thus, setting up a quorum for validity of a referendum instead of clearing it, muddles the picture even more than it already is. With all of this in mind, one comes to a conclusion that it would be better if this idea were scrapped altogether, since the only sensible proposal this particular “reform package” is the one on raising the bar for the number of signatures needed to call a referendum. Everything else will do more harm than good.

 

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