Frmr Croatian President Says Janša Is “Unbalanced”


Stipe Mesić says Janez Janša is “unbalanced”. Croatian only, I’m afraid (source)

Aftermath of Sunday referendum vote provided for some funny moments. One in particular. Former Croatian president Stipe Mesić was caught on camera by Croatian NOVA TV while chatting with his successor, incumbent Ivo Josipović and Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor. Mesić, known for his quick wit and even quicker gaffes said that “this Janša seems a bit unbalanced to me”. President Josipović then added that “[Janša’s] positions bombed his referendum bid” while PM Kosor was nodding “Yes, yes, yes”.

The scene caused some chuckles this side of the border, especially since the initial interpretation of Mesič’s statement was that Janša is mentally unbalanced (“neuravnovešen” in Slovenian), while Mesič himself later said that he meant to say that Janša’s views are unbalanced (“neuravnotežen“). Janez Janša and his SDS obviously refused to comment and in all honesty the statement is below par even for gaffe-prone Mesić, but it did provide for some light comedic relief after a month of hearing how the world as we know it will come to an end if the Arbitration Agreement is confirmed :mrgreen:

The New Statesman

Two days ago pengovsky wrote that following Sunday’s vote on the Arbitration Agreement put PM Borut Pahor on a track to evolve from a politician to a statesman. A bold statement, to be sure. But there are reasons for it and they are not directly connected with political ramifications of yesterday’s vote.

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A new statesman. Borut Pahor will hopefully not turn into Alan B’Stard. But there is some physical resemblance nevertheless 😉

Regardless of the fact that Slovene – Croatian border dispute was, from local perspective anyway, increasingly starting to look like something from the West Bank, it is not the only dispute in town, nor it is the most complex. Just take a look around.

Hungary recently passed a law which grants Hungarian citizenship to members of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. This in itself would not be problematic, weren’t it for the fact that Hungary and Slovakia have a troublesome history, as well as the fact that both countries have an increasingly dominant nationalistic element. Add to that the fact that Hungary (according to The Economist) is celebrating National Unity Day to commemorate the Trianon Treaty signed after the end of WWI, which deprived it of more than 70% of its territory and has a nasty reek of wishing “the good old days return”. Slovaks are, understandably going apeshit, passing reprisal laws and making references to Hungarian fascist past.

Moving on down, the same Hungarian law applies to Hungarians living in Romania as well. However, Romania is apparently doing the same, awarding Romanian citizenship to its minority in Moldova, so they can’t really complain. It still isn’t kosher, though. Giving away your citizenship to your minorities in other countries is bound to cause tensions and misgivings, as citizenship brings about its own set of duties and privileges, not in the least the right to vote, pay taxes and (if applicable) serve in the army. A country is not happy when its citizens exercise these rights in the name of another country.

South of Romania is Bulgaria, which – apart from having its own myriad of problems – takes a condescending attitude towards Macedonia. Bulgarians long held that Macedonian is just a Bulgarian dialect and have treated its former Yugoslav neighbour accordingly. The tensions and cross looks have eased somewhat, but the animosity and attitude are still there. Not that Macedonia doesn’t have its share of problems, both with Greece (which will not recognise its northern neighbour under its chosen name Macedonia) as well as with its large ethnic Albanian minority.

Which brings us to Kosovo. I trust we need not go over the shithouse that is the Kosovo problem, suffice it so say that some people are again contemplating breaking Kosovo in two, where the northern part (populared mostly by Serbs) would merge with Serbia, whereas the larger, southern part would remain independent. The caveat is that Kosovo Albanians made it clear that in such case they’d demand Serbia give up the Preševo province, which (for all intents and purposes) is located within Serbia proper, but does sport a large Albanian minority. And if that happens, who is to say that Kosovo will not merge with Albania. Which is a recipe for disaster. Since Serbian appetites for Great Serbia have been successfully curbed in the past two decades, it would simply not to allow anything remotely similar to Great Albania come into existence.

Unrest in Kosovo is almost directly linked to unrest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country in more or less idle running ever since the Dayton Accords. There too a policy of micro steps is being followed as any jolt in any direction will likely cause a domino effect and bring the house down, quite probably bringing about another round of Balkan carnage (just as Kosovo would if things went out of hand). Problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina are as much linked to Serbia as they are linked to Croatia, both of which have large ethnic groups in the country (I’m sure you know the details) and both countries have in the past been happily awarding citizenships to their brethren living in Bosnia, just as Hungary is doing now.

And speaking of Croatia, this country has its own set of problems with its neighbours. For example: There is a border dispute with Serbia on the Danube and with Montenegro on Cape Prevlaka at the very southern tip of Adriatic coast. The latter is supposedly solved (but has a status of an interim solution) while the former has barely been touched. Both are potentially explosive.

And this, ladies and gentlemen, brings us full circle to the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute. It is not the largest not the most explosive in the region. And yet, there were police stand-offs, bomb scares and similar shit. You can imagine how complicated other disputes are, then.

So, by solving one dispute and hopefully bringing about a solution acceptable for both sides, PMs Borut Pahor and Jadranka Kosor have shown prudence, restraint and commitment to peace. All of those are rare commodities in this part of the world, where drawing and redrawing borders, not unlike Janez Janša demanding territory south of Savudrija (to give an example completely at random) can lead to disaster.

By defusing what was increasingly becoming a flashpoint, PM Pahor can (not necessarily will) become a statesman whose opinion may be valued beyond the (now defined) borders of his country and the Arbitration Agreement can (not necessarily will) become a model for solving similar disputes in the region. So, a new statesman. Not exactly in the Alan B’Stard sense of the word, but the jibe is too good to miss. Then again, who knows… :mrgreen:

Arbitration Agreement Approved (Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta)

With almost 100% of the vote counted the Arbitration Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia was approved with 51,49 percent in favour. The turnout was slightly over 42 percent, which – although much lower than anticipated – is still among the highest on Slovenian referenda.

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PM Borut Pahor following a tight referendum victory (photo: Marko Miščević/Jutarnji list)

The result is good news for Slovenia as it paves the way for solving the Slovenia – Croatia border dispute in a manner acceptable to both sides. This defuses a potentially very dangerous situation which has only recently (and temporarily) improved with PMs Borut Pahor and Jadranka Kosor seizing the initiative and hammering out a deal which received a lacklustre performance on both sides of the border. And yet, this is the first time in nineteen years an agreement was reached, which is an achievement in its own right.

This is even better news for Prime Minister Borut Pahor who won a huge political victory over opposition leader Janez Janša. Politically speaking, there was a lot riding on this one and Janša, hell, the entire right wing lost. True, they lost by the smallest of margin. But given the unpopularity of Pahor’s government (most of the electorate would not touch it with a ten-foot pole), winning this referendum should be like a walk in the park for Janša. But SDS leader failed to make this a referendum on Pahor’s government, or – even better – Pahor succeeded in separating the issue from the general unpopularity of his government, which makes today’s victory at the polls even more .

Responses from the losing side were predictable enough. That “only 21% voted yes“. That “the country remains split“. That “traitors won”. That “everybody lost”. And – perversely – that “now it the time to start working together”. It all came from the same side which proposed that Slovenia demand territory south of Savudrija and that approving the agreement is akin to losing Klagenfurt (Celovec) in 1920 (for the record – Slovenia didn’t “lose” Celovec then. It didn’t get it in the first place). On the other hand, responses from the winning side didn’t excel either, but their statements were definitely more muted in excitement.

Prime minister Pahor is halfway there to winning a gamble of galactic proportions. He succeeded where PMs Peterle, Drnovšek, Bajuk, Rop and Janša had failed. This alone gets him a spot in the history books. But if the arbitration court decides (as is expected to) favourably both to Slovenia and Croatia, then he should probably be promoted from a politician to a statesman. I know some of you are diving for your barf bags after reading the last sentence, but today’s vote really is that big.

However, Pahor is not yet there. Slovenia and Croatia must now set up the court as well as prepare memoranda detailing their respective cases and real work had only begun. Hic Rhodos, hic salta.

The Definitive Guide to the Arbitration Agreement Between Slovenia and Croatia, pt. 5

T- 4 days and counting. Supporters of referendum held their final rally in downtown Ljubljana, while opponents will to the same on Friday.

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Ninamedia’s poll shows the gap between “yes” and “no” vote closing (source)

The Poll

Pollster Ninamedia is running a longitudal poll on behalf of Mladina magazine which is returning mighty interesting results. First of all, the turnout is projected to be positively huge as far as Slovene referendums are concerned. As much as 70 percent of people polled will surely or likely vote. In a country where anything above 30 percent turnout in a referendum vote is considered a lot, this is massive. As for preferences, data show that opponents of the Agreement are closing the gap. At this point those in favour of the Agreement hold a lead somewhere between 4 and 9 percent, but this is apparently fading away. This will go down to the wire and every vote will count.

The Bomb (or the lack thereof)

The last week of the campaign was uneventful in terms of “important new developments”. There were some powerful echoes (Twitter included) of Janez Janša’s statement on Sunday about hhow Slovenia should demand territory around Savudrija as to ensure integrity of the Bay of Piran, but that was more or less it. Word on the street had it that Janša was preparing some sort of document release, but rumours are always thick on the ground in times like this. At any rate, it is too late to orchestrate a massive shift in voting preferences. Both sides are more concerned with getting out the vote. At least, they should be 🙂

The Vote

Pengovsky already voted (fuck it, I’m emigrating over the weekend, just in case) and there are no prizes for guessing how :mrgreen: . But there are ample reasons why it would be a good thing if Arbitration Agreement were approved by the people.

-It paves a way for a solution both Slovenia and Croatia can live with. It is specific on goals and vague on way of achieving them. Which is precisely what we need at this point. Direct Slovenian access to high seas is specified as a goal and it is up to the court to concoct a way to make it happen.

-It nullifies any and all unilateral actions either side (mostly Croatia) took after 25 June 1991 and starts afresh. This includes the mishap over Slovene checkpoint at Dragonja border crossing

-It basically resurrects the famed Drnovšek-Račan Agreement, which was the closest two countries ever came to a deal on their own. This deal was never ratified by Croatia and it was discarded by Slovenia during Janša’s rule when he unwisely made a deal with Ivo Sanader about solving the dispute in front of International Court in The Hague. Having Drnovšek-Račan back on the table is incredibly helpful to Slovenia’s cause.

-This is the last, best chance for a viable solution. Both Slovenia and Croatia are in the middle of a deep economic and possibly social crisis. If this remains unsolved (and favourably, at that!) it is inevitable that certain people on both sides of the border will use the dispute to advance their own political agenda. If a deal is not reached soon, expect further incidents, provocations, police stand-offs and sooner or later someone will lose his or her nerves and people will die.

The End

This concludes the Guide. Sure, the campaign continues tomorrow, but tomorrow is Friday and you know what happens on Fridays 😈 Sunday evening should be interesting, though…

P.S.: for the complete Guide click here

The Definitive Guide to the Arbitration Agreement Between Slovenia and Croatia, pt. 4

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Stand-off between Slovene and Croat police near Hotiza in 2006 (photo: Tadej Regent/Delo)

Tee-minus-six days and counting. The debate on the Arbitration Agreement is in its final stages, with neither side as yet delivering a crushing blow. But the night is still young and there’s ample time until Friday evening both for opponents as well as proponents of the Agreement to give it one more shot at securing those extra percent of votes which will quite possibly tip the balance.


Curiously enough, both sides seem to expect to lose the vote which is quite possibly a first. Obviously one of those sides is wrong, but – neglecting the possibility of false modesty – this does show that things have long since gotten out of control, that uncertainty runs high and that the whose shebang will probably go down to the wire.


Beating the drums


As the clock ticks away, we are witnessing final pushes by both sides to win at least some of the undecided vote. In case of PM Borut Pahor and government this means generating (artificially or otherwise) a wide range of support by people and organisations who previously did not support arbitration or had at the very least voiced concerns over it. Every party in the coalition is organising its own round tables, debates and Q&A sessions. This is aimed at both reassuring the faithful as well as trying to convince those who might still have doubts.


Alternatively, organisations like WWII veterans’ organisation came around and are now supporting the Agreement although its leader Janez Stanovnik (a prominent diplomat in 60s and 70s, the last president of Slovene socialist presidency and as of recent honorary citizen of Ljubljana) months ago said that asking a third party to decide the issue goes against what this country fought for. But apparently a push came to a shove and now organisations like Stanovnik’s are rallying behind the Arbitration Agreement.


On the other hand, the opposition is trying to up the ante. Days ago Janez Janša said that there are alternatives to the Agreement. At first he said that his SDS will present alternatives a month after the referendum, but when pressed on it, he said that alternatives include a) bilateral agreement based between the two countries based on Drnovšek – Račan Agreement, b) an arbitration agreement which excludes use of international law and c) an arbitration agreement which would at the very least specifically say that Slovenia has access to the high seas.


You will note, no doubt, that for all the hubbub about high treason, betrayal of vital interest and supposed ceding of holy Slovene land and seas, Janša’s alternatives go very much in the same direction as does the Pahor-Kosor Arbitration Agreement. Even more, he made his “alternatives” public only after it was dug up that Janša in 2007 said that he cannot imagine any sort of arbitration court awarding Slovenia less than the Drnovšek- Račan agreement of 2001. In all fairness, it should be written that his position now is that this agreement is paving the way for exactly that: Slovenia getting less that the Drnovšek-Račan agreement.


But as things stand, this agreement is most likely to be used as a reference point anyway, since it was the closest two countries ever came to an agreement, while (non)use of international law and the phrase “territorial access to high seas” is something Janša and his SDS have always held against the agreement at hand.


These issues were detailed in English days ago by Žiga Turk, former minister of development during Janša’s stint as PM. Turk, who (slightly off-topic) is rumoured to be a possible SDS candidate for Ljubljana mayor in autumn municipal elections, basically sets out a set of grievances opponents of the agreement have been voicing over and over ever since the Agreement was signed. His post, although not as nearly unbiased as he claimed and en passant accused yours truly of resorting to political spin, does show that the bottom line lies somewhere else.


Territorial claims


This is about territory. Wile the Arbitration Agreement settles on 25 June 1991 as “day zero” and a starting point for settling the dispute, the opposition sees this as an opportunity to undo some of the historical injustices Slovenes had to endure throughout history. Specifically: After the Free Trieste Territory was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy, it was only Slovenes which were left on the “wrong side” of the border, thus disenfranchising Slovenia in favour of Croatia.


Ergo, Croatia should make concessions to Slovenia to “right this historical wrong”. And just how should Slovenia go about this? According to SDS leader Janez Janša (as stated Sunday last on POP TV) Slovenia should claim sovereignty not only over the entire Bay of Piran but also over the Savudrija area on the other side of the bay, land which on 25 June 1991 was undisputedly Croatian.


Stop. Rewind. Play. President of the largest opposition party, former prime minister of this country and former chairperson of the EU Council stated a territorial claim against a neighbouring country. Ladies and gentlemen, this is how wars start.


Sure, you could say that this was just impotent rage or a cheap bluff by a politician afraid of losing a big part of his political platform. But there’s more to that than meets the eye. There’s a pattern. During his re-emergence as defence minister during the short-lived centre right government of Andrej Bajuk, Janez Janša (after yet another incident in the Dragonja area, now known as Jorasland) proposed that Slovenia send special police forces to the disputed area to enforce Slovenian sovereignty over the area (link in Slovene). Nothing ever happened, since Bajuk’s government was thrown out of office in favour of Janez Drnovšek and his then-almighty LDS.


However, six years later, this time with Janša as prime minister, another incident took place, this time in the Hotiza area in Prekmurje region, where Croatia began constructing levies on another patch of disputed area. This time Janša and his government did send special police units to the area, resulting in a stand-off that he and his Croatian counterpart Ivo Sanader had to solve by meeting in person in the area (link again in Slovene).


And now, he’s willing to do it all over again.


How so?


Speaking from a political science point of view, this quite probably has to do with what is today predominantly understood as a right-wing definition of a nation, which is defined by its borders. Borders which separate “us” from “them”. Remember, this is not just about exercising sovereignty. For the opposition it is about righting a historical wrong. However, there are other wrongs, much closer to present which would probably have to be dealt with.


As readers of this blog know, what were once administrative borders between republic became international borders between sovereign nations once Yugoslavia broke apart. In case of Slovenia and Croatia this mean that the two nations had to establish checkpoints and border crossings. And this where Slovenia made a crucial mistake early on. When establishing its checkpoint on what was later to become Dragonja international border crossing, the first Slovenian government for one reason or the other decided to pull back the position of its checkpoint some two hundred metres inland. Upon seeing this Croatian authorities established their checkpoint north of the bed of the river Dragonja, effectively putting the median line between two checkpoints further north, thus starting this whole thing.


OK, so you’re an inexperienced and internationally unrecognised government and you just skated more or less clean out of a what could have been a prolonged and extremely bloody armed conflict, while your neighbour (Croatia) is getting gutted from bladder up. You just don’t want to press your luck. Fine, we’re cool with that. The only awkward thing is that the defence minister at the time and the person making territorial claims against Croatia today are one and the same person.


Janez Janša was an illustrious defence minister who together with Igor Bavčar (later of Istrabenz infamy), Milan Kučan and other senior leadership made history in 1991. OK, so today we have the power of hindsight and can say that they all fucked up with that checkpoint. Had they established it further south, none of this would have happened. But hindsight can be deceptive. There is no reason to berate Janša or anyone else at the time for doing what they did. On the larger scale of things we can all just thank them and whatever god we may believe in that things went as they did.


However. This does preclude anyone in Slovenia, Janša especially, from making any sort of territorial claims, especially those based on “righting a historical wrong”. Even more – holding hostage a perfectly viable agreement which can possibly bring about a border solution both countries can live with, just to save one’s face is irresponsible and a sign of petty politics. And don’t forget that Janez Janša once already resorted to such trick, when vetoing Croatian NATO entry just because his government’s creative accounting techniques were exposed.


Stop fooling around and get back to the facts


So, where was we? Ah yes. The bottom line is that for all the talk about history, rights, wrongs, dos, don’ts and such, it all boils down to how one reads articles 3 and 4 of the agreement, as detailed by fellow Twitterer Matjaž Janša (no relation to SDS leader Janez Janša, link again in Slovene) Opposition for some reason believes that the court will interpret it in Croatia’s favour. God knows how they came to that conclusion, but there you go.


True, there is little-to-none judicial practice on “junction to high seas”. But this does not play against Slovenia. Quite the opposite. This will allow the arbitrary court to create international law rather than simply refer to existing laws. If anything, this increases the chances of a solution both countries can live with. Even more: since the Agreement sets 25 June 1991 as “date zero” this also means that there is a real chance of the court pushing the border on the river Dragonja south, thus automatically rejecting Croatian claims that border runs down the middle of the Bay of Piran and making it all the more likely that both countries will get what they want: Croatia to keep its maritime border with Italy and Slovenia to keep its access to high seas. I’m not saying it will happen, I’m saying there’s every chance of it happening.


What do the polls say


Depends. There were a couple of polls early last week which showed that a majority was against the deal, but last polls again show a majority in favour of the referendum. Slovenian election legislation prevents media from publishing polls a week before the vote, so any data which might be available will be “internal”. A notable exception being Mladina weekly. The magazine announced yesterday on its Twitter account that it will run a longitudal poll from tonight until Friday. It will publish its results in its webpage in clear violation of the election law. They’ll probably get fined for it, but the media has for years now been trying to change this part of the law which in all honesty is rather redundant in an era when people get their information on the net 24/7.


Informed guesses vary wildy, but – as mentioned in the beginning – people on both sides are seeing internal polling results and are not happy. It will quite probably come down to turnout, although pengovsky heard an estimate of as much as sixty percent of votes in favour of the agreement, but that is probably overly optimistic no matter how you look at it.


So what was that MS word thing?


Oh, that 🙂 Well, it was funny really. You remember the last time around, when opposition was trying to declare the Agreement null and void? Well, it turned out that the MS Word document they sent out as a press release was actually created on a computer belonging to Ministry of foreign affairs. According to media reports an investigation was launched into the matter but it will probably come down to nothing, and for two reasons: One, SDS said that they were merging documents and that the original »author« watermark remained. And two, it is very likely that the document was (largely) written by former foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, who is still employed at the ministry, but is being tasked only with keeping a ficus and producing CO2. And given the fact that Rupel’s list of transgressions against his employer is already as long as pengovsky’s you-know-what (microphone chord, you pervert!), this only adds one notch to a long and distinguished line of misdemeanours.


Anyways, this concludes the lesson for today. Tune in tomorrow for a brief update :mrgreen: