World Affairs | SLEEPING WITH PENGOVSKY

The End of Belgium, Part II

A guest post by dr. Arf, naturally.

Like the Good Doctor reminded me today, Belgium hasn’t let anyone down and stayed true to its tradition of creating crisis and instability in this little country. I’ve been saying it before and I say it again : Belgium is only a country in name anymore and, as was once again evidenced in the past three years, the water between the respective regions is proving to get increasingly deeper, up to the point where it’s ocean sized. And in my somber estimates, we’re not far from that point. Sit back and have a drink nearby, this is a long one, because the matter is complicated and requires some explanation. My sincere apologies…

I already attempted to explain the problems situated in the region around Brussel, which is Flemish territory, but over the past fifty years got increasingly inhabited by francophones. Now, I must say there is a significant difference between francophone Brusselians and Walloons. Our Wallonian brethren and sisters probably are scratching their heads just as much as their Flemish counterparts about this issue, but one thing is for sure : everyone has become sick and tired of the whole thing.

A quick recap of what it is about: an electoral district was created, called Brussel – Halle – Vilvoorde. Constitutionally, it is however illegal, because the Halle – Vilvoorde part is Flemish territory, meaning that Wallonian politicians have no legal right to campaign for votes there. The problem, of course, then becomes that there are too many votes to be gained from H – V for the Brussel Capital Region, and this of course doesn’t sit well with said parties, especially the Wallonian Liberals of MR and their cartel partner, the FDF, which in itself was established to claim the rights – rightfully or wrongly – of the francophones in the Flemish region around Brussels way back when. Their current president, Olivier Maingain has been walking around with a box of matches and a can of gasoline for the past three years, demanding that H-V should be added to Brussel, giving nothing in return and even demanding more money and the official appointment of three francophone mayors elected in the last municipal elections, who refuse to abide by Flemish constitutional law and therefore aren’t eligible to govern their respective municipalities. This, in turn, is of course fuel on the fire of moderate Flemish Nationalist party NV-A (not related to the Viet Cong, I assure you), for whom the division of B-H-V can only happen unconditionally. And even the other Flemish political parties don’t really feel like giving too much concessions anymore.

So, we had federal elections in June of 2007 and the winning party, Flemish Christian Democrats CD&V and their front man, prime minister Yves Leterme won the elections – with then cartel partner NV-A – on the promise of taking �?five minutes of political courage’ to divide B-H-V. It won Yves 800.000 preferential votes that immediately became the political millstone around his neck, as none of the Walloon politicians wanted to negotiate with him. You can read all about that in my previous series. Fact of the matter is that, ever since, there has been negotiation after negotiation, for three years straight, because the Walloon politicians simply refused to budge and neither did the Flemish. CD&V and NV-A parted ways not even a year after the elections because CD&V in the end didn’t prove to have the political courage to take those five minutes to divide B-H-V unilaterally together with all other Flemish parties. NV-A has since then become a major player, gaining a lot of votes in the last regional elections of 2008, not in the least because party leader Bart Dewever is an old school politician who knows his dossiers, is an apt historian and has a no nonsense attitude, telling it like it is and presenting himself the way he is unapologetically. He also has a dry and cynical sense of humor which seems to be appreciated by many a Fleming. In that sense, he and his party are the Wallonian parties’ worst enemy and that the politicians who landed this country in this mess some twenty odd years ago when Belgium became a federal state, on the idle hope that both regions would continue to understand each other. However, give a region its own constitutional powers and gradually transfer most of the governmental authorities that used to be in the hands of the federal parliament to them, and they will turn onto themselves, watching and reading only their own news bulletins, expanding on their own culture and becoming more and more ignorant about that of their neighbours and becoming more ignorant about each other to the point where Belgium has de facto become a divided entity, with few common ground to rally together. The common ground, in this case, consists almost uniquely of tennis players Justine Henin (Walloon), Yanina Wickmayer and Kim Clijsters (both Flemish). And maybe, just maybe, our blundering national football (soccer) team. And that, my friends, is it.

So what happened last Thursday? Well, after Herman van Rompuy, our beloved European President – if you count out UKIP EMP Nigel Farage, of course – took office, Yves Leterme returned as Belgium’s PM for a third time. It was agreed that former PM and European heavyweight Jean-Luc Dehaene, also of CS&V signature, would work out a plan to divide B-H-V that everyone could live with from December till Easter. Dehaene, who’s big on discretion as well as body mass index, wasn’t seen or heard, unless to say that this deadline was extended until the end of the Easter holidays. At that time, freshly elected Flemish Liberal Democrat party Open-VLD party leader Alexander De Croo – a coalition partner in the government – is alleged to have said that this deadline had to be respected and the B-H-V negotiations should by then have �?landed’, or they would leave the government. This was reiterated at the start of this week, when it became apparent that the Wallonian parties didn’t think Dehaene’s propositions went far enough and the latter exited in a huff of anger about their conduct during the negotiations, not in the least that of Olivier Maingain. The deadline came, and uncharacteristically true to their word, Open-VLD left the government, effectively putting this land in a federal crisis, causing the federal government to fall. De Croo alleged that it was apparent that the Walloons were just playing their tired old tactics of not wanting to negotiate, then saying the negotiations that DID take place were a basis for… negotiations to commence, and he would be right. However, all the other parties in the �?negotiations that were no negotiations according to the Wallonian parties’ came out saying that there was a basis to continue, at least until next Thursday, after which the Flemish parties would attempt to unilaterally vote the division of B-H-V. They further said that Open-VLD had agreed with that before concluding the negotiations, which was categorically denied by De Croo. Meanwhile, PM Leterme went to the king for the fifth time in three years to offer his government’s resignation, which the king said he’d take under advisement, and invited Federal Assembly president Patrick Dewael (Open-VLD) and asked him to put a stop to parliamentary proceedings for the day, in order to let everyone calm down, because it was apparent from early on that both CD&V and Open-VLD would try to put the vote to divide B-H-V on the agenda. The chaos which ensued in the Belgian parliament was something I watched with open mouth, while extreme right nationalist party Vlaams Belang took it upon themselves to sing the Flemish �?national’ anthem De Vlaamse Leeuw �? (The Flemish Lion), which is always guaranteed to disconcert the Walloons. It’s no wonder that, of course, this became the �?hot item’ on the Wallonian news as well as the newspapers down south. I’m sorry to say, but the Wallonian press and politicians just can’t seem to get their priorities straight. VB singing in the parliament scares them more than the fact they themselves have a big hand in helping to succeed what they fear most – the constitutional split of Belgium – while gangsters with Kalashnikovs raiding a jeweler and having a shootout in the midst of Brussel is considered a �?fait divers’. Nothing going on there, it happens in London and Paris too, so it’s not a big deal. I have to say �?quoi?!’ (yes, that is where Ljubljanchans get their �?kva’ from, thanks to Napoleon).

Back to the topic at hand, that same evening, Alexander de Croo was summoned by the king as well and afterwards went on record saying that he was more than willing to continue negotiations, if and only if the Wallonian parties would agree to set the deadline to next Thursday (that was implied, not said out right) and they would adhere to the propositions that Dehaene had made with no further additions. He also went on to defend his party’s governmental exit by saying that it was meant only as a strong signal to the Walloons that their philandering would not be acceptable anymore after three years of stalling. Other Flemish parties alleged that Open-VLD had made this move to score in the – constitutionally illegal – new elections that would undoubtedly follow this crisis and that they never constructively participated in the current government anyway, which of course was denied. My take on it is, that both grounds are true, with the one facilitating the other.

So, what will happen next? No one knows. The king appointed MR spearhead and vice PM Didier Reynders as negotiator to see if there’s still a basis for talks. Next Thursday, when the parliament reconvenes, it is however suspected that if talks fail, both CD&V and Open-VLD will put the �?division’ vote on the agenda, with the Walloons blocking it by filibustering and using what’s called an �?alarm bell procedure’, to take the vote off the table. As it stands, the Flemish parties could still unilaterally vote for the division, as they have done before. In any case, MR-FDF, in lieu with the other Wallonian parties, succeeded in making the Wallonian nightmare scenario, the end of constitutional Belgium, come dangerously close by their hardline demands and handing Open-VLD a way out of the government. Why? Well, if there will be new – and, again, illegal – elections, all political commentators agree that at the time of the new formation negotiations, the Wallonian politicians will find even less desire in their Flemish counterparts to come to a consensus, because it is becoming apparent that, while being sick and tired of the antics of their political representatives, theFlemish constituents will give their votes to those parties who will promise to make the division of B-H-V happen without any or at least the least amount of concessions. NV-A will have a field day. At least one Wallonian party – the Christian democrat CDH – sees that this would be a nightmare scenario and yesterday came out saying by way of party leader Joëlle �?Madame Non’ Milquet that the expansion of Brussel is not a must.

The only way this country will get a lifeline, is if both sides back down a bit, the Flemish accept that some concessions are unavoidable and the Walloons relent their unwillingness to negotiate and refrain from increasing their demands, knowing they will never get them. By which time the government can actually do what it is elected to : working on a solution for the economic crisis and improving people’s lives, none of which it apparently had the time or will to occupy itself with in the past three years. So far, we’ve had three years of nothing and have become the laughing stock of Europe to boot. But as it stands, the constitutional split of Belgium, as far as I can see, isn’t a question of �?if’ anymore, but of �?how soon’ and �?how’. With Flanders being tired of putting up with Wallonian demands about everything from land concessions to money transfers to prop up their badly managed economy (which is said to be on the rise, but so far, I’m not seeing it, while the long bankrupt Brussel Captial Region is still run on Flemish money, by the way) and Wallonia increasingly viewing the whole of Flanders as extreme separatist and making increasingly irresponsible political moves and demands as a result of that fear, we seem to go �?himmelhoch jauchzend zum Ende’. What this potentially could lead to, is something many a Slovene can testify of.

Parliament Ratifies Arbitrage Agreement While Janša Sits Outside

After a heated debate Slovene parliament yesterday finally ratified the arbitrage agreement between Slovenia and Croatia. In a somewhat curious development MPs voted with 48 votes in favour and none against, while the opposition collectively left the chambers and obstructed the vote. The vote will now be put to a referendum, which is expected to take place on June 6.

(source)

The debate went along the now familiar lines. The coalition more or less claimed that the agreement is the best thing since sliced bread (well, almost), while the opposition said that the whole thing is tantamount to high treason. In the last few weeks, as the government scrapped plans to hold a preliminary consultative referendum on the issue, the whole thing revolved around the question of a majority needed to ratify the document. The opposition claimed that the agreement deals in constitutional matters therefore it should be ratified with a 2/3 majority, just like the Lisbon Treaty or EU enlargements. The government on the other hand said that this is a bilateral treaty like so many others and that a relative majority suffices.

The government is of course right in this case. While it is true that the result of the arbitrary proceeding will deal in constitutional matters (i.e.: border between Slovenia and Croatia), the treaty itself does not. It only establishes a ways to come to a border solution which both countries will have to ratify regardless of the fact that they have committed themselves to abide by the ruling of the ad-hoc court of arbitrage.

But despite spewing tons of sulphur, magma, acid and volcanic ash in the coalition’s general direction, saying that the agreement will surely cut Slovenia from high seas, terminate it’s status as an Adriatic and Mediterranean country and otherwise spell eternal damnation for fearless seafaring Slovenes (Because if it didn’t why on Earth would Croats have ratified it at all? eeeer, because they… like… want to join the EU and were practically manhandled into cooperating? No, doesn’t count?), the opposition had precious little to work with.

Janez Janša, having been once already fucked by Ivo Sanader (the sensation was heightened by his own foreign policy inexperience and Dimitrij Rupel’s legendary ineptitude and self-righteousness) is in no position to oppose the agreement. He and his SDS have criticised the agreement plenty, but it is one thing to oppose it via legal and semantic interpretations of its text, it is quite another to oppose the document by voting against it.

Readers of this blog will remember the shitstorm Janša created after blocking Croatia’s NATO entry just because his government was shown to have done some creative accounting. The whole anti-Croatian thing nearly spun of control back then and he seems to have learnt his lesson. For now at least.

Therefore, rather than put his money where his mouth is and vote against the agreement, Janša and his SDS, followed by the rest of the opposition walked out of the parliamentary chamber and skipped the vote. The end result was thus 48 in favour and none against.

Janša’s “strategic withdrawal” can be interpreted in a variety of ways:

First (and possibly most likely) is the one where he just doesn’t want to be responsible for what would be rightfully perceived as sabotage of yet another attempt to solve the issue.

Second it is possible that he recognises that the document ain’t all bad and that there is actually a fair chance of a solution both Slovenia and Croatia can live with.

And third it might be that the public still favours the solution (the last poll showed some 55% in favour of the arbitrage agreement and 36% or so against) and he really doesn’t want to be caught on the wrong side of the public sentiment. Not now when the ruling Social Democrats have tumbled in the polls (from 17 to just 13 percent) and when more than 70 percent of people voters do not support the government.

So, as pengovsky wrote some time ago, Janša is trying to sit this one out for as long as possible, but his happy days are nearing an end. The coalition is expected to move to have a referendum called on June 6 and by then Janša will have to say whether he supports the document or not. So far he stopped just short of that.

However, he may have already passed the point of no return. Because if the agreement is a success, there is only one Slovenian who will be basking in the glory of the achievement and it will not be the leader of the opposition, if you catch my meaning.

But if the whole thing turns out to be a disaster, there will be a blitzkrieg campaign of “I told you so”, followed probably by collapse of the government and – you guessed it JJ at the helm and the dispute dragging on for another five to ten years.

And why June 6, you ask? It’s the last weekend before the World Football championship and apparently the government PR machine thinks that people will be a) at home and b) more positive-thinking. The fact that by then most of Slovenes will have already prepared their retreats at Croat seaside for the summer season (but not yet visit them) is believed to help as well. I’m not kidding. Given the volatility of the issue, it actually may come down to that.

Constitutional Court OKs Pahor-Kosor Deal

Hours ago Slovene Constitutional Court ruled with an eight-to-one vote that the Pahor-Kosor agreement on arbitrage on border between Slovenia and Croatia does not violate Slovenian Constitution. Therefore Slovenian parliament can start the ratification procedure of the agreement which has sparked heated debate on both sides of the border and where both prime ministers – Borut Pahor and Jadranka Kosor – were accused of sell-out, high treason, acting against their respective countries interests and so forth ad nauseam

But while Croatian parliament has ratified the agreement in December 09, things got hairy in Slovenia when the opposition said that it will call a legislative referendum if the coalition rams the ratification through the parliamentary procedure. at that time the coalition backed down, promising to ask the Constitutional Court to decide on constitutionality of the agreement and to hold a non-binding preliminary referendum on the issue before ratification procedure continues.

Today’s decision by the Court is a big victory for PM Pahor, as it comes at a time when his government is severely deficient in the good-news-department. Furthermore, an 8-to-1 vote in favour is a massive boost for the future of the agreement itself, as it shows that the infamous Article 3 is not nearly as dodgy as the opposition (in this case especially Radovan Žerjav‘s SLS) would have us believe.

However, this is only one hurdle cleared. The other part of the government’s pledge was to hold a preliminary referendum on the agreement. While results of a preliminary referendum are not legally binding (and have been ignored on occasions in the past) it would be politically intolerable for the government to lose a referendum and continue with the ratification regardless. In fact, it would have been politically intolerable for the government to lose the referendum. Period. Because if the voters decide against it, Pahor’s stock would sink and since it is not exactly buoyant as it is, he would probably have no choice but to resign.

So, the question du jour is whether go skip the referendum and risk a binding legislative referendum after the agreement is ratified. It seems that this is exactly what the government is mulling right now. Whether or nor this is a good idea and why there might be more to it than meets the eye, will have to wait for tomorrow, though 🙂

Defenestration

What do Karl Erjavec and Ivo Sanader have in common? Not much, actually 🙂 Defenestration is, however, one of those things.

(source and source)

Last Monday in what was a swift, decisive and merciless action, former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader was expelled from Croatia’s ruling HDZ party after he tried to stage a comeback, supposedly because he realised that both the country and the party need him at the helm to stay the course. He added that his leaving politics three months ago was a mistake and that he realised that, hence the return. Flanked by his most ardent supporters in a hastily called press conference on Sunday last, he said that he supports his successor Jadranka Kosor, but then went on to criticise her politics as well as meagre result HDZ got in the first round of Croatian presidential elections (a mere 12 percent) and it soon became obvious that he wanted to install himself as PM. Being the honorary party president for life (a function created especially for him, apparently), he actually was in a position to do so, and it soon became obvious that we were witnessing an attempted party putch.

Kosor, however, turned out to have balls of steel. She quickly rallied her troops, among them prominent members of HDZ’s hard-line fraction, who were believed to unequivocally support Sanader. She even had Vladimir Šeks, a hawk-deluxe pour over the party’s statute and concoct a way to excommunicate honorary president for life. Having achieved this, she walked into a press conference of her own, and explained in no uncertain terms that had she or some other member of the party tried to pull a trick Sanader did while the latter was still party president, he or she would literally be thrown out the window.

As a result Ivo Sanader will apparently attempt to activate his MP status. Not being familiar with Croatian legislation I’m not sure how he aims to achieve this, but it turns out that this is another thing he and Karl Erjavec have in common. The soon-to-be-defenestrated minister of environment yesterday made it clear that he will attempt to gain MP status although he was not elected to the parliament (thus being the only parliamentary party president failing to achieve that).

As it became apparent that the parliamentary majority (with or without DeSUS) will vote Erjavec out of office, PM Borut Pahor asked Teflon Karl to pick his own successor since the environment portfolio is DeSUS’ turf. Erjavec made a move that was obivous to everyone, but it was deemed too desperate and too preposterous even for him. And yet, he is trying to do just that – to persuade DeSUS MP Matjaž Zanoškar to be nominated as minister for environment. If Zanoškar accepted, his seat would be – due to laws of elections mathematics – taken by Teflon Karl himself.

And thus would both Ivo Sanader and Karl Erjavec become MPs, enjoying many privileges of their function, including legal immunity. And from the outside it looks like both of them are going to need it.

Pahor-Kosor Agreement Could Usher Major Shifts In Slovenian Politics

Prime Ministers Jadranka Kosor and Borut Pahor signed the agreement on arbitrage in the border dispute between the two countries in Stockholm, Sweden an hour ago. This brings the process almost back to the point it had once already reached with the Drnovšek-Račan agreement of 2001. This time around, however, we do not have a final solution, but rather an agreed mode of seeking the solution in front of a court of arbitrage. However, once the agreement is signed, it will have to be ratified by both parliaments. Specifically, this means that Croatian parliament will have to support the agreement with a 2/3 majority, whereas Slovene parliament will need to secure a relative majority of all MPs present at the time of the vote. In case of Slovenia, this is where it gets interesting.

Pahor and Kosor sign the deal, witnessed by Swedish PM Fredrik Reinfeldt (source)

After parliamentary committee on foreign relations supported the agreement yesterday (enabling PM Pahor to sign the deal), opposition leaders started talking about holding a referendum. Technically, it should be a cakewalk. All that would be required are 30 MPs (a third of the parliament) formally requesting the referendum. Between Janez Janša’s Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) with 28 votes, Radovan Žerjav’s Slovene People’s Party (SLS) with seven and Zmago Jelinčič’s Slovene National Party with five votes, this should really not be a problem.

However. A little birdie told pengovsky yesterday that Janez Janša is not at all keen on a referendum. Janša himself said as much later in the evening after appearing on state television and saying that it will probably come to a referendum, but as a result of a civil initiative. Which means that SDS will not chip in their 30 MPs, but will let SLS and SNS collect 40.000 signatures needed to hold a consecutive referendum on ratification of the Pahor-Kosor agreement.

Why is that? We’ve touched upon the answer in yesterday’s post. By signing the agreement PM Pahor basically put all of his eggs in one basket, crucially exposing himself and (by extension) his coalition. Should the agreement fail one way or the other, he will probably have to resign. Janša obviously sensed that and is doing plenty to make this happen. However. As former PM and having been humiliated by former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader on the border issue (Ivo Sanader famously cajoling him into accepting international law as the sole point of reference in solving the dispute), Janša knows perfectly well just how fantastically complicated a quagmire this border dispute actually is. So Janša is looking to bring down the government by beating Pahor over his head by repeating incessantly just how bad this agreement is, but stopping short of shooting down the agreement itself, hoping that SLS and SNS will do the dirty work for him.

The nationalist are in this probably just for fun, because their “postmodern” politics allows them to quicky adopt a new political platform, which does not necessarily correspond with anything they’ve advocated to date. All they need is an unoccupied political niche which will bring enough votes. If the dispute is solved, my bet is that they will either run on a platform of protecting Slovenian minorities in neighbouring states or start advocating some far fetched “solution” for the economic crisis.

As we noted yesterday, SLS is following its own agenda, which is basically very simple. Solving the border dispute would deprive them of a big part of their political platform, so it is in their vital interest that the agreement does not come to fruition. Basically, they’re fighting for survival. And this is where it gets complicated, as SLS’ political demise is one the of not-so-covert mid-term goals of Janez Janša. His ambitions to be the sole political factor on the political right (the only one worth mentioning, at the very least) were nearly fulfilled in 2008 elections, where he squeezed his junior coalition partner Christian Democratic Nova Slovenija (NSi) out of the parliament. The party didn’t make the 4% cut, a fate SLS (the other Janša’s coalition partner) only narrowly avoided.

Things get an additional thrust when one takes into account the fact that municipal elections are less than a year away. Municipal (local) elections are interpreted as a mid-term measure of strength of political parties. And although people tend to read too much into them, they can have a huge psychological impact. And this time around, autumn 2010 can be a turning point for future development of political right in Slovenia.

Namely, NSi is desperate to stage a comeback. They managed to hold on to the fringes of the political arena by their fingernails by winning a single seat in this year’s European elections and are desperate for a strong showing on local level, which would give them enough base and confidence to try to re-enter parliament in 2012 (which would be a first, by the way. Until now, once a party dropped out of the parliament, it stayed there). Given the fact that their near-death experience left an unhealthy vacuum in the Christian democratic niche of the political spectrum, they actually stand a chance, since both SDS and SLS have failed to move in and fill the vacuum completely. But the question is if there’s enough space left for them (errr… right for them… errr… nevermind…)

On the other hand, Janša and his SDS will want to reassert their dominance over SLS and NSi as well as stick one up Pahor’s ass and score an all-round victory. Which is not all that unlikely a prospect given the fact that the government’s ratings are going south as it is and that a rebound is nowhere in sight. In a year’s time the Pahor-Kosor agreement will again become a hot political potato, provided Pahor survives the referendum or at the very least avoids one in the near future. By autumn 2010 Croatia will probably have finished the negotiations and the ratification process will begin. Which is the trigger for the actual arbitrage proceedings to start, which will then cue in vicious rhetoric on betrayal of national interest and that is very much likely to hurt the electoral result of Pahor’s Social Democrats and of the ruling coalition as a whole.

So, what we’re seeing today is actually a multi-way chess game with everyone playing against everyone else simultaneously. Slovenian government against Croatian government. Then we have Slovenian government against Slovenian opposition, which is aiming to destabilise the government by undermining the treaty. Then we have the three opposition parties against each other, each with its own agenda. Putting all of this together, it can start a chain-reaction which will culminate in local elections, where finally, we have the ruling coalition which will want to capitalise on their election victory and score major points in local communities as well, with the opposition looking to hurt the coalition as much as possible.

And suddenly, a year from now, we might end up with a significantly different political landscape, regardless of the fact that things looked boringly predictable only a week ago. And the Pahor-Kosor agreement signed today can be a catalyst for all of it.

Croatian Parliament OKs Agreement, Slovenian Opposition Mulls Referendum

Yesterday evening Croatian parliament voted to approve the arbitration agreement between Croatian PM Jadranka Kosor and her opposite number in Slovenia Borut Pahor aimed at finally solving the border dispute between the two contries. The debate in Sabor (the parliament) was fierce and Kosor had to endure a barrage of criticism and insults. She was even accussed of “premeditated high treason” (as if there’s any other kind), giving away 100 square kilometres of Croatian sea and so on ad nauseam. Kosor responded by saying that the agreement is the best possible under current conditions and that the clause 3b does not automaticlly mean direct Slovenian access to high seas. But just to be sure, she attached an unilateral statement to that effect, which she hopes will be co-signed by the Swedish EU Presidency. In the end, despite everything eighty MPs out of 134 voted in favour of the agreement.

Sabor votes on the agreement (photo: Ranko Šuvar, source)

One of the results of the vote is that we can now finally see the official text of the agreement (scroll down to page 7 for English original), specifically, the infamous clause 3b, which speaks of “Slovene junction to high seas”. But even more importantly, the document reveals (in Article 11) that the whole procedure will begin only after Croatia signs the EU accession treaty. Now, as with clause 3b, this particular stipulation is being read almost as many ways as there are people reading it (on that note, let me add that the amount of experts on English language has risen dramatically on both sides of the border in the past few days since the document was leaked).

Anyhoo. The Croatian position seems to be that Croatia will enter the arbitrage proceedings as a full member of the EU which should even the odds against Slovenia in terms of political leverage. It also believes that this is a way to avoid a possible Slovenian referendum on Croatian EU entry due to an unfavourable decision by the court. Given the fact that the EU membership process usually lasts about a year, while the court is expected to deliberate at least three years, they may well be on to something.

Thus the ball entered the Slovenian court, where the unilateral statement Croatia added to the document is making everyone nervous. PM Pahor already said that – should the Swedish presidency co-sign the Croatian statement (as per Kosor’s wishes) – the deal is off as the statement can be understood to deny Slovenian direct access to high seas and can therefore influence the interpretation of the text of the actual agreement. But as he is preparing to run the agreement by the parliamentary foreign relations committee once again, the opposition is rumoured to be preparing a motion to severely stall the process or even to call a referendum on the agreement itself.

This is in part fuelled by an opinion by former judge at the constitutional court Janez Čebulj, who days ago wrote that referendum on the arbitrage agreement should be held before the two PMs sign it and not after the deed. Now, one can say that Čebulj’s opinion is biased and politically motivated. After all, he is known to be on good terms with the political right and rumour had it that he on more than one occasion leaked information on politically sensitive issues to SDS before the Court’s final rulings. However, on the whole he was a good constitutional judge, much better than many people are willing to admit. Therefore his opinion carries weight. PM Pahor and the coalition will have to present good arguments against holding a referendum at this junction (pun very much intended)

On the other hand, it has to be said that the opposition, specifically, Janez Janša of SDS, Radovan Žerjav of SLS and Zmago Jelinčič of SNS probably have ulterior motives for shooting down the agreement. This is a very tricky moment for the government as well as for PM Pahor personally. If he fails, his credibility will have been damaged the field of foreign relations, the only area where he indisputably knows where his towel is. So, shooting down the agreement basically means shooting down Pahor and forcing him to resign from office. Or, at the very least, making him extremely docile.

Also, resolving the border dispute would deprive the current opposition of a big part of their political platform and – as a result – of their electorate. Curiously enough, this would least affect Jelinčič’s nationalist party, as their platform shifts to accommodate an untapped source of votes (being strongly nationalistic in 1992 and 1996, they campaigned on a pro-Serb, anti-NATO platform in 2000). Lack of Slovene-Croat border dispute would damage Žerjav’s Slovene People’s Party (SLS) as the dispute is more or less their raison d’etre, but it would also make dent Janša’s ratings, although not by much.

So, there are a few ways how this could still go wrong. We’ll see later today how things turn out. A Cabinet session is due to start in about 15 minutes, after which parliamentary committees on foreign and EU relations will convene in a special session and debate the issue.

However, the opposition can use its 30+ votes to call a subsequent referendum only after the agreement is ratified in the parliament (presumably mid-December). If they wanted to hold a conslutative referendum, they’d have to convince a majority of MPs, which is not likely to happen any time soon. The bottom line therefore is, that the referendum is most likely to be held some time in early 2010. Unless of course someone devises a smart way of avoiding it altogether.

Oh, So Fucking Close To Heaven…

For a brief moment yesterday evening it seemed that a consensus was reached in Croatian politics on the arbitrage agreement with Slovenia. At about seven o’clock, just in time for prime time news, Croatian media started making noises about an emergency cabinet meeting convened by Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor. The news was all the more melodramatic as a scheduled cabinet meeting had already taken place earlier in the day.

Croatian opposition leader Zoran Milanović (SDP) explaining why he opposes the Pahor-Kosor agreement (source)

It turned out that following Monday’s visit of her Slovenian counterpart Borut Pahor in Zagreb, Kosor held coalition talks where the agreement apparently got the reluctant nod. According to various accounts in Croatian media she then proceeded to see how things stand with the opposition and apparently things were looking good as she convened an evening meeting with leaders of all parliamentary parties which was to be followed by a cabinet meeting, where the government would formally approve the agreement, allowing Kosor to sign it perhaps as early as today, while she is visiting Brussels.

Unfortunately, the consensus (if there ever was any) fell apart as Social Democrats, the main opposition party led by Zoran Milanović apparently still had misgivings about the wording of the agreement. Specifically, they are bothered by the stipulation that the arbitrage tribunal will decide on Slovenian junction (or contact) with high seas. Incidentally, this is precisely the point which bothers opposition in Slovenia as well. At any rate, the lack of support by SDP meant that Kosor does not have the required 2/3 majority she needs to carry the motion in the parliament. As a result, negotiations in Croatia will apparently continue on Friday.

Coming this close to a solution naturally fuelled speculation about what exactly happened that allowed this sudden (if not entirely successful) push forward. Obviously Pahor’s visit to Zagreb did bear fruit, contrary to what leader of Slovenian opposition Janez Janša said on Tuesday. Jadranka Kosor herself said yesterday after cancelling the cabinet meeting that Slovenia might very well re-invoke the blockade if the agreement is not passed. On the other hand it seems that SDP’s Zoran Milovanović was nudged a bit closer to supporting the agreement, since he was at least willing to talk it over, something he apparently refused to do until now. This may or may not have to do with the fact that Slovene PM Borut Pahor (who just happens to be Milanović’s social democratic brother-in-arms) paid him a visit after meeting Kosor on Monday.

Since the stick rarely works without the carrot, it seems logical (although entirely unsubstantiated by as much as a shred of evidence) that Pahor tried to sweeten the deal as well. Croatian media speculate (and Slovenian media is happily following suit) that Pahor offered to settle claims Croatian citizens have against Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), which are the result of Slovenian restructuring of the banking sector in mid-nineties and which amount to several hundred million euros. Until now Slovenia claimed that these claims are to be solved within the framework of Yugoslav succession treaty, but – if media speculation is correct – there is a possibility of a quid pro quo on both issues. On the other hand, this could be just a ploy to undermine what was achieved, since this sweetener could easly be interpreted as a sell-out, as “money-for-territory” which would be tantamount to high treason. Not that these charges are limited to Croatia. Only today Slovenian PM Pahor was accused of high treason by Mlada Slovenia, youth organisation of far-right Nova Slovenija.

At any rate, more will be known on Friday, when negotiations in Croatia will continue. But fact of the matter is that the longer they take, the smaller the chances are for a consensus in Croatian politics. Obviously the same goes for Slovenian politics as well.