Author: pengovsky

T- 4 days and counting. Supporters of referendum held their final rally in downtown Ljubljana, while opponents will to the same on Friday.

Ninamedia’s poll shows the gap between “yes” and “no” vote closing (source)

The Poll

Pollster Ninamedia is running a longitudal poll on behalf of Mladina magazine which is returning mighty interesting results. First of all, the turnout is projected to be positively huge as far as Slovene referendums are concerned. As much as 70 percent of people polled will surely or likely vote. In a country where anything above 30 percent turnout in a referendum vote is considered a lot, this is massive. As for preferences, data show that opponents of the Agreement are closing the gap. At this point those in favour of the Agreement hold a lead somewhere between 4 and 9 percent, but this is apparently fading away. This will go down to the wire and every vote will count.

The Bomb (or the lack thereof)

The last week of the campaign was uneventful in terms of “important new developments”. There were some powerful echoes (Twitter included) of Janez Janša’s statement on Sunday about hhow Slovenia should demand territory around Savudrija as to ensure integrity of the Bay of Piran, but that was more or less it. Word on the street had it that Janša was preparing some sort of document release, but rumours are always thick on the ground in times like this. At any rate, it is too late to orchestrate a massive shift in voting preferences. Both sides are more concerned with getting out the vote. At least, they should be 🙂

The Vote

Pengovsky already voted (fuck it, I’m emigrating over the weekend, just in case) and there are no prizes for guessing how . But there are ample reasons why it would be a good thing if Arbitration Agreement were approved by the people.

-It paves a way for a solution both Slovenia and Croatia can live with. It is specific on goals and vague on way of achieving them. Which is precisely what we need at this point. Direct Slovenian access to high seas is specified as a goal and it is up to the court to concoct a way to make it happen.

-It nullifies any and all unilateral actions either side (mostly Croatia) took after 25 June 1991 and starts afresh. This includes the mishap over Slovene checkpoint at Dragonja border crossing

-It basically resurrects the famed Drnovšek-Račan Agreement, which was the closest two countries ever came to a deal on their own. This deal was never ratified by Croatia and it was discarded by Slovenia during Janša’s rule when he unwisely made a deal with Ivo Sanader about solving the dispute in front of International Court in The Hague. Having Drnovšek-Račan back on the table is incredibly helpful to Slovenia’s cause.

-This is the last, best chance for a viable solution. Both Slovenia and Croatia are in the middle of a deep economic and possibly social crisis. If this remains unsolved (and favourably, at that!) it is inevitable that certain people on both sides of the border will use the dispute to advance their own political agenda. If a deal is not reached soon, expect further incidents, provocations, police stand-offs and sooner or later someone will lose his or her nerves and people will die.

The End

This concludes the Guide. Sure, the campaign continues tomorrow, but tomorrow is Friday and you know what happens on Fridays 😈 Sunday evening should be interesting, though…

P.S.: for the complete Guide click here

Stand-off between Slovene and Croat police near Hotiza in 2006 (photo: Tadej Regent/Delo)

Tee-minus-six days and counting. The debate on the Arbitration Agreement is in its final stages, with neither side as yet delivering a crushing blow. But the night is still young and there’s ample time until Friday evening both for opponents as well as proponents of the Agreement to give it one more shot at securing those extra percent of votes which will quite possibly tip the balance.

Curiously enough, both sides seem to expect to lose the vote which is quite possibly a first. Obviously one of those sides is wrong, but – neglecting the possibility of false modesty – this does show that things have long since gotten out of control, that uncertainty runs high and that the whose shebang will probably go down to the wire.

Beating the drums

As the clock ticks away, we are witnessing final pushes by both sides to win at least some of the undecided vote. In case of PM Borut Pahor and government this means generating (artificially or otherwise) a wide range of support by people and organisations who previously did not support arbitration or had at the very least voiced concerns over it. Every party in the coalition is organising its own round tables, debates and Q&A sessions. This is aimed at both reassuring the faithful as well as trying to convince those who might still have doubts.

Alternatively, organisations like WWII veterans’ organisation came around and are now supporting the Agreement although its leader Janez Stanovnik (a prominent diplomat in 60s and 70s, the last president of Slovene socialist presidency and as of recent honorary citizen of Ljubljana) months ago said that asking a third party to decide the issue goes against what this country fought for. But apparently a push came to a shove and now organisations like Stanovnik’s are rallying behind the Arbitration Agreement.

On the other hand, the opposition is trying to up the ante. Days ago Janez Janša said that there are alternatives to the Agreement. At first he said that his SDS will present alternatives a month after the referendum, but when pressed on it, he said that alternatives include a) bilateral agreement based between the two countries based on Drnovšek – Račan Agreement, b) an arbitration agreement which excludes use of international law and c) an arbitration agreement which would at the very least specifically say that Slovenia has access to the high seas.

You will note, no doubt, that for all the hubbub about high treason, betrayal of vital interest and supposed ceding of holy Slovene land and seas, Janša’s alternatives go very much in the same direction as does the Pahor-Kosor Arbitration Agreement. Even more, he made his “alternatives” public only after it was dug up that Janša in 2007 said that he cannot imagine any sort of arbitration court awarding Slovenia less than the Drnovšek- Račan agreement of 2001. In all fairness, it should be written that his position now is that this agreement is paving the way for exactly that: Slovenia getting less that the Drnovšek-Račan agreement.

But as things stand, this agreement is most likely to be used as a reference point anyway, since it was the closest two countries ever came to an agreement, while (non)use of international law and the phrase “territorial access to high seas” is something Janša and his SDS have always held against the agreement at hand.

These issues were detailed in English days ago by Žiga Turk, former minister of development during Janša’s stint as PM. Turk, who (slightly off-topic) is rumoured to be a possible SDS candidate for Ljubljana mayor in autumn municipal elections, basically sets out a set of grievances opponents of the agreement have been voicing over and over ever since the Agreement was signed. His post, although not as nearly unbiased as he claimed and en passant accused yours truly of resorting to political spin, does show that the bottom line lies somewhere else.

Territorial claims

This is about territory. Wile the Arbitration Agreement settles on 25 June 1991 as “day zero” and a starting point for settling the dispute, the opposition sees this as an opportunity to undo some of the historical injustices Slovenes had to endure throughout history. Specifically: After the Free Trieste Territory was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy, it was only Slovenes which were left on the “wrong side” of the border, thus disenfranchising Slovenia in favour of Croatia.

Ergo, Croatia should make concessions to Slovenia to “right this historical wrong”. And just how should Slovenia go about this? According to SDS leader Janez Janša (as stated Sunday last on POP TV) Slovenia should claim sovereignty not only over the entire Bay of Piran but also over the Savudrija area on the other side of the bay, land which on 25 June 1991 was undisputedly Croatian.

Stop. Rewind. Play. President of the largest opposition party, former prime minister of this country and former chairperson of the EU Council stated a territorial claim against a neighbouring country. Ladies and gentlemen, this is how wars start.

Sure, you could say that this was just impotent rage or a cheap bluff by a politician afraid of losing a big part of his political platform. But there’s more to that than meets the eye. There’s a pattern. During his re-emergence as defence minister during the short-lived centre right government of Andrej Bajuk, Janez Janša (after yet another incident in the Dragonja area, now known as Jorasland) proposed that Slovenia send special police forces to the disputed area to enforce Slovenian sovereignty over the area (link in Slovene). Nothing ever happened, since Bajuk’s government was thrown out of office in favour of Janez Drnovšek and his then-almighty LDS.

However, six years later, this time with Janša as prime minister, another incident took place, this time in the Hotiza area in Prekmurje region, where Croatia began constructing levies on another patch of disputed area. This time Janša and his government did send special police units to the area, resulting in a stand-off that he and his Croatian counterpart Ivo Sanader had to solve by meeting in person in the area (link again in Slovene).

And now, he’s willing to do it all over again.

How so?

Speaking from a political science point of view, this quite probably has to do with what is today predominantly understood as a right-wing definition of a nation, which is defined by its borders. Borders which separate “us” from “them”. Remember, this is not just about exercising sovereignty. For the opposition it is about righting a historical wrong. However, there are other wrongs, much closer to present which would probably have to be dealt with.

As readers of this blog know, what were once administrative borders between republic became international borders between sovereign nations once Yugoslavia broke apart. In case of Slovenia and Croatia this mean that the two nations had to establish checkpoints and border crossings. And this where Slovenia made a crucial mistake early on. When establishing its checkpoint on what was later to become Dragonja international border crossing, the first Slovenian government for one reason or the other decided to pull back the position of its checkpoint some two hundred metres inland. Upon seeing this Croatian authorities established their checkpoint north of the bed of the river Dragonja, effectively putting the median line between two checkpoints further north, thus starting this whole thing.

OK, so you’re an inexperienced and internationally unrecognised government and you just skated more or less clean out of a what could have been a prolonged and extremely bloody armed conflict, while your neighbour (Croatia) is getting gutted from bladder up. You just don’t want to press your luck. Fine, we’re cool with that. The only awkward thing is that the defence minister at the time and the person making territorial claims against Croatia today are one and the same person.

Janez Janša was an illustrious defence minister who together with Igor Bavčar (later of Istrabenz infamy), Milan Kučan and other senior leadership made history in 1991. OK, so today we have the power of hindsight and can say that they all fucked up with that checkpoint. Had they established it further south, none of this would have happened. But hindsight can be deceptive. There is no reason to berate Janša or anyone else at the time for doing what they did. On the larger scale of things we can all just thank them and whatever god we may believe in that things went as they did.

However. This does preclude anyone in Slovenia, Janša especially, from making any sort of territorial claims, especially those based on “righting a historical wrong”. Even more – holding hostage a perfectly viable agreement which can possibly bring about a border solution both countries can live with, just to save one’s face is irresponsible and a sign of petty politics. And don’t forget that Janez Janša once already resorted to such trick, when vetoing Croatian NATO entry just because his government’s creative accounting techniques were exposed.

Stop fooling around and get back to the facts

So, where was we? Ah yes. The bottom line is that for all the talk about history, rights, wrongs, dos, don’ts and such, it all boils down to how one reads articles 3 and 4 of the agreement, as detailed by fellow Twitterer Matjaž Janša (no relation to SDS leader Janez Janša, link again in Slovene) Opposition for some reason believes that the court will interpret it in Croatia’s favour. God knows how they came to that conclusion, but there you go.

True, there is little-to-none judicial practice on “junction to high seas”. But this does not play against Slovenia. Quite the opposite. This will allow the arbitrary court to create international law rather than simply refer to existing laws. If anything, this increases the chances of a solution both countries can live with. Even more: since the Agreement sets 25 June 1991 as “date zero” this also means that there is a real chance of the court pushing the border on the river Dragonja south, thus automatically rejecting Croatian claims that border runs down the middle of the Bay of Piran and making it all the more likely that both countries will get what they want: Croatia to keep its maritime border with Italy and Slovenia to keep its access to high seas. I’m not saying it will happen, I’m saying there’s every chance of it happening.

What do the polls say

Depends. There were a couple of polls early last week which showed that a majority was against the deal, but last polls again show a majority in favour of the referendum. Slovenian election legislation prevents media from publishing polls a week before the vote, so any data which might be available will be “internal”. A notable exception being Mladina weekly. The magazine announced yesterday on its Twitter account that it will run a longitudal poll from tonight until Friday. It will publish its results in its webpage in clear violation of the election law. They’ll probably get fined for it, but the media has for years now been trying to change this part of the law which in all honesty is rather redundant in an era when people get their information on the net 24/7.

Informed guesses vary wildy, but – as mentioned in the beginning – people on both sides are seeing internal polling results and are not happy. It will quite probably come down to turnout, although pengovsky heard an estimate of as much as sixty percent of votes in favour of the agreement, but that is probably overly optimistic no matter how you look at it.

So what was that MS word thing?

Oh, that 🙂 Well, it was funny really. You remember the last time around, when opposition was trying to declare the Agreement null and void? Well, it turned out that the MS Word document they sent out as a press release was actually created on a computer belonging to Ministry of foreign affairs. According to media reports an investigation was launched into the matter but it will probably come down to nothing, and for two reasons: One, SDS said that they were merging documents and that the original »author« watermark remained. And two, it is very likely that the document was (largely) written by former foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, who is still employed at the ministry, but is being tasked only with keeping a ficus and producing CO2. And given the fact that Rupel’s list of transgressions against his employer is already as long as pengovsky’s you-know-what (microphone chord, you pervert!), this only adds one notch to a long and distinguished line of misdemeanours.

Anyways, this concludes the lesson for today. Tune in tomorrow for a brief update

Here it is, yet another instalment of everything you wanted to know about the Arbitrage Agreement but had the smarts to wait for pengovsky 🙂 For parts 1 and 2 click here and here respectively

PM Pahor in debate with ministers Žbogar, Lukšič and Svetlik (source: Baž Samec/Delo)

Tee-minus-eleven days and the referendum campaign is raging with full force. As pengovsky writes this, the parliament is in yet another extraordinary session, debating what opposition SDS calls “new and important circumstances” regarding the Arbitrage Agreement. What Janez Janša et al. claim is that Slovenia somehow accepted unilateral declaration Croatia passed alongside its ratification of the Agreement, saying basically that the agreement means what Croatia wants it to mean.

SDS and the rest of opponents of the agreement argue that since Croatia said both Slovenia and Croatia will have notified the Swedish presidency of its unilateral declaration, Slovenia somehow agreed to Croatian interpretation of the agreement, hence PM Borut Pahor and his government committed an act of high treason.

Flip-Flop

The problem – or rather the “problem” – is that Slovenia did no such thing. Croatia’s declaration was entirely unilateral and was in no way, shape or form a part of the Arbitrage Agreement itself. Being repeatedly told that by PM Pahor predictably did not convince the opposition. If anything it only amplified cries of treason, PM’s incompetence and sell-out of this country’s vital interests. As always, on live TV. But then came the twist.

Even before the extraordinary session started Swedish ambassador to Slovenia Inger Ultvedt said that Swedish government received no joint statement other that the fact that the Arbitrage Agreement is to be signed and its signature witnessed by Swedish PM. She added that no unilateral statement was part of the Agreement itself. That, however, apparently wasn’t enough. The opposition still went on and on and on like a the proverbial Energizer bunny until the US ambassador to Slovenia Bradley Freden said the same. He went even further, saying that Croatian declaration was unilateral in every sense of the word

An then came the flip-flop. Less than two hours after US Embassy went public, Janša’s SDS sent out a press release saying that US and Swedish statements make the entire Agreement null and void, because Croatia lied about that statement being joint, when it was actually unilateral. Since international agreements are to be executed in good faith and Croatian behaviour was anything but, the Agreement cannot be executed and is therefore dead.

Let me run that by you again: Opposition loudly claims (citing Croatian sources) that Slovenia agreed to Croatian declaration about what exactly the Agreement is all about. Slovenian government denies that and points out that Slovenia passed a similar declaration which claims exactly the opposite. It adds that both declarations mean didly-squat because the Agreement itself stipulates that no unilateral actions apply to the solution of the border issue. Opposition is not convinced and calls an extraordinary session of the parliament to discuss these “important new developments”.

As the debate commences, both Sweden and the US (the former witnessing the signature of the Agreement while the latter reportedly man-handling Croatia into accepting the deal) say that Croatian declaration is entirely unilateral and as such has no effects with regard to the Agreement. At this point one would expect the opposition to cease debating as the reason for the parliamentary session no longer exists. Wrong. Instead, they call the Agreement null and void because Croatia cheated. I’d have to say.. a sphincter says what? Exactly!

Same Old Tactics of Epic Bullshit

Croatian unilateral declaration was of course only the sorriest of excuses for the opposition (SDS, SLS and SNS) to yet again hijack parliamentary Rules and Procedures and to debate ad nauseam the finer points of epic bullshit. The debate was going over all the pros and cons time and time again, each time getting more personal and more below the belt. No wonder it didn’t stop after US and Swedish statements, because the debate was never meant to address “new and important developments” but rather just to start yet another round of verbal slaughter and see who comes out on top.

But hey, you can’t blame them, can you? These tactics worked before, not in the least in the summer of 2004 when Janez Janša and his SDS went after LDS and then PM Tone Rop, and effectively won the elections. But back then LDS and its leadership were tired, paralysed and arrogant. Janša tried again in 2007, just after Danilo Türk was elected president and then again just prior to 2008 elections which he in the end lost. But this time not only did it not work, but it positively backfired. SDS’ arguments crumbled into sun dust and the final result is that opposition remains opposed, while the government argues in favour of the Agreement. And since these are exactly the same positions as in the beginning, one could say that Janez Janša just wasted a joker.

Polls

Namely, if opponents of the Agreement were on top in the debate then we could have called the session just a waste of time. But since polls show that a majority of those who intend to vote actually support the Agreement, then yesterday’s stalemate spells disaster for Janša and good times for those who actually wish to see this thing solved in a fair way. Not only did Delo, nation largest daily poll an impressive 52 percent in favour of the Agreement and only 24 against, but even Faculty of Applicative Social Sciencies in Nova Gorica, widely regarded as leaning towards Janša and his SDS polled 36 percent in favour and 31 against.

This goes to show that SDS is rapidly failing to turn the referendum on the Arbitrage Agreement into a referendum on Pahor’s government, whose approval ratings linger in low thirties. Having people to vote more or less on merit and much less out of anger is one of Pahor’s key goals and so far he seems to be getting his point accross. Much will of course depend on the voter turnout, which is at this time projected not to go above 35 percent. Which is criminally low but totally common for Slovenian referendums. The record holder for the lowest turnout if of course sill former PM Janez Janša whose referendum on regions in 2008 failed spectacularly with a mere 11 percent turnout.

This will have to do it for today, although we haven’t covered every subject announced in the previous chapter. However, next up will be an interesting story about some people struggling not to lose face and still others struggling with MS Word 😀

Finally, with ten-or-do days to go until the referendum, the second instalment of pengovsky’s Definitive Guide to the Arbitrage Agreement Between Slovenia and Croatia :). For the first part, click here

Approximation of the Drnovšek-Račan agreement. Taken from this post

Campaigning pro and contra the Arbitrage agreement is vicious. I’m talking distilled venom of the Brazilian wandering spider here. From day one, there were direct hits below the belt, ad personam attacks, cynicism and sarcasm galore (iLike those, but still) and both sides, coalition and opposition, have embarked on an campaign trail rarely seen for a referendum vote. This will be a bitter fight that will do right down to the wire. So, what are they sayin’ and who’s got more leg to stand on?

Heading South

The case for supporting the arbitrage agreement is compelling. Slovene- Croat relations were at an all time low, just as Slovenia was headed for elections in 2008. Ever since 2001, when Croatian parliament refused to ratify the Drnovšek-Račan agreement, which was as close to a solution as the two countries ever caome, bilateral relations were heading south.

Border incidents were had a regular recurrence rate (i.e.: every time either country was in a pre-election period) and Croatia was establishing what George Bush jr. would surely have called “a new reality on the ground”, which peaked in the 2005 as then-PM Janez Janša and his foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel were apparently outfoxed by Croatian PM at the time Ivo Sanader, who somehow coaxed them into agreeing that the dispute should be solved in front of the International Court in Hague, which (so it is understood) has a tendency to solve such disputes by drawing a direct line down the middle of the disputed area, which would in this case put Slovenia exactly where it doesn’t want to be. It is still not entirely clear why Janez Janša at the time made the deal that he had made, but fact of the matter is that of all the agreements ever made, that one served Slovenian interests least.

Luckily, that was yet another deal that came to nothing, but at some point tensions along the border grew and there were several tense moments by the River Dragonja and even a police stand-off along a disputed area by the River Mura. And then, just as Slovenia ended it’s six-month presidency of the EU in 2008, Janša’s government started making noises about blocking Croatian EU negotiations until such time the border dispute is solved in a way that makes Slovenia happy. This policy was followed by the new government of Borut Pahor and as a result Slovene-Croat relations went deep-freeze.

Several rounds of negotiations were held between Slovenia and Croatia and PM Pahor was desperate to show that the dispute is not about Slovenia taking it out on Croatia, but rather that it has legitimate concerns regarding the border dispute. Slovenian position was not helped by the freshly ousted Janša, who vetoed ratification of Croatian NATO entry (a development which ran parallel to the border dispute) and a referendum on that was very nearly called.

And then PM Sanader resigned, Jadranka Kosor succeeded him and suddenly, there was more love between Ljubljana and Zagreb then one could fit into a Dainelle Steel novel. In a relatively short period of time (and with a little help from our EU friends, most notably Commisioner Olli Rehn) an agreement was trashed out, which set forth the rules by which the dispute is to be solved. It was to become known as the Arbitrage Agreement, the Pahor-Kosor Agreement or as the Stockholm Agreement

The Shit

There are a couple of neat things regarding this particular piece of paper, linked above:

Firstly, in Article 5 it sets the date of declaration of independence as the critical date. This means that the ad-hoc arbitrage court will accept situation on the ground as it was on 25 June 1991 as reference. No unilateral decision by either country will count any more. Technically this means that whatever territorial “gains” either side may have made in the last twenty years, they became null and void and that the whole process of drawing borders in the disputed areas will begin from square one.
Secondly, there are the infamous articles 3 and 4. The former stipulates the subjects of the arbitrage, while the latter stipulates the methods used in reaching the decision. In short, it dictates combines use of international law, equity and good neighbourly relations to achieve a fair result, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

And finally, there’s the word “junction” which pengovsky already detailed in yesterday’s post. Apparently, junction doesn’t have a specific meaning in the international law. Opponents of the arbitrage agreement point to this as the main flaw of the Agreement, hence liberal applications of words like “incompetence”, “treason”, “betrayal” and what not.

But in reality this is the beauty of this document. Since there is no convention (in the sense of “common usage”) on this word, the arbitrary court can twist and turn it, to try to come up with a solution that will enable Slovenia and Croatia to both have the cake and eat it. How exactly this will be achieved remains to be seen, but the point is that by using an unconventional word, possibility for an unconventional solution opens. Had Pahor and Kosor agreed on a more conventional word (like “passage” or “direct contact”) one of the two parties would have given in by default.

International law

Opponents of the Agreement are quick to point out that according to Article 4, item (a), the court will use international law to decide the maritime border, and then proceed from that point on to see what can be done to grant Slovenia access to high seas. But, so goes their reasoning, since the border will by then have already been drawn down the middle of the Bay of Piran, there will be bupkis that could be done for Slovenia, so we will have lost. Tough shit.

However, what opponents of the Agreement fail (or refuse) to see is to understand that articles (and indeed the entire document) must be read holistically and not only item by item. Meaning that *while* border between Slovenia and Croatia will be drawn by using international law, Slovenian direct access to high seas will be decided using other methods. Not *after* not instead, but while.

Even more: the dreaded phrase “use of international law” is actually much more up Slovenia’s alley than it may seem at first glance. Namely, international law is nothing else than a body of multi-lateral conventions and bi-lateral agreements. There is no world police to enforce international law it is not an accepted and rigid code by which everyone plays, but rather an ever changing mass of legal text which can bear more or less relevance to the matter at hand.

And this is where the Agreement becomes important. The moment it is ratifies, the Agreement will become international law and will as such be used as a legal reference point in solving the dispute. And since the document widens the manoeuvring area, it may become possible to still use international law (with Agreement now a part of it) and not necessarily claim that it prescribes the maritime border be drawn down the middle of the bay.

It is a neat trick, but to understand it, one needs to realize that international law does not necessarily follow the same logic as domestic law.

A Gamble of Galactic Proportions

It would be wrong to say that the result of the Agreement is a foregone conclusion. It isn’t. But we’re closer to a solution both countries can live with than we ever were in the past, with the possible exception of Drnovšek-Račan agreement. But one thing is for certain. If a satisfactory solution is solved (and this document goes to great lengths to point out that a fair decision must be reached), then the Slovenian political right lost a big source of cheap votes.

No longer will marched “on the South border” be held, no longer will police stand-offs be a convenient way to divert public attention. And no longer will the border issue be a free-for-all political platform in that political menstrual cycle we – for the lack of a better word – call elections.

Even more: In Slovenia at least, removing the border issue will most definitely put at least one political party at peril. Slovene People’s Party (SLS) of Radovan Žerjav is life-threateningly dependant on continuation of the dispute. They put all of their political eggs (note that I did not use the word balls) in one basket and now it is being taken away. No more dispute, no more SLS.

The situation is only slightly better with Janez Janša’s SDS. In all honesty, the largest opposition party is not nearly as much dependant on this issue, but as it tries to dominate the political right wing, the party and its leader have moved further to the right on this issue, so solving the dispute would mean a major drawback in voter animation and a lot of resources go to waste.
Curiously enough, the only one who will probably not get hurt either way, is Zmago Jelinčič of Slovene National Party. Although the leader of nationalists is currently farting in Croatia’s general direction, he and his »post-modern« politics are just as capable of supporting Croatia and even demanding the Slovenian constitution be amended to include special rights for Croatian minority in Slovenia. Whatever brings votes 😀

On the others side of the aisle, however, the stakes are even higher. Should PM Pahor pull this off and achieve a favourable result, he would have achieved probably the only remaining “holy grail” of Slovene foreign policy and quite rightly enter the history books. Which would be all the more stunning given the fact that a lot of people did not think he’d last a year in office. Pahor was right the other day when he said that part of Janša’s opposition has to do with the fact that Janša failed, while Pahor came oh so fucking close to heaven.

The Deal

So, what decision will the court reach? No one knows and those who say they do, are either presumptuous morons or lying bastards. Probably both. However, since most of you already think of pengovsky as a moronic presumptuous lying bastard, I’ll give it a shot 🙂

Despite the fact that the Agreement gives the court ample room to manoeuvre, there is only so much it can do. The closest two countries ever came to a deal was the oft-cited Drnovšek – Račan deal (see picture above) and it seems reasonable, that the court will revisit it. However, that will likely be the starting point, rather than the end of the arbitrary process. Proponents and opponents of the agreement in Slovenia are spewing ash and sulphur at each other at the rate that would make Eyjafjallajökull blush. More on that and on the latest polls tomorrow, but in all the brouhaha one thing sort of vanished from the radar: the possibility of a condominium.

Pengovsky has a hunch that what the court will look at is the possibility of declaring the famed “Drnovšek-Račan” corridor a condominium instead of declaring it a part of the high seas (as per the above agreement). I’m not saying that it will happen, I’m just saying that it might very well happen, because there’s only so much you can do to have the cake and eat it.
By declaring the corridor a condominium, both countries would exercise full sovereignty over that particular strip of the sea. Slovenia would have sovereignty over the part of sea which has direct contact with international waters, while Croatia would at the same time maintain a direct maritime border with Italy.

Tune in tomorrow, to see how the two sides are faring ten days before the referendum, what the polls are saying and why “defenders of holy Slovene soil” have such a hard time accepting the fact that the issue might actually get resolved.