Author: pengovsky

Prime Ministers Jadranka Kosor and Borut Pahor signed the agreement on arbitrage in the border dispute between the two countries in Stockholm, Sweden an hour ago. This brings the process almost back to the point it had once already reached with the Drnovšek-Račan agreement of 2001. This time around, however, we do not have a final solution, but rather an agreed mode of seeking the solution in front of a court of arbitrage. However, once the agreement is signed, it will have to be ratified by both parliaments. Specifically, this means that Croatian parliament will have to support the agreement with a 2/3 majority, whereas Slovene parliament will need to secure a relative majority of all MPs present at the time of the vote. In case of Slovenia, this is where it gets interesting.

Pahor and Kosor sign the deal, witnessed by Swedish PM Fredrik Reinfeldt (source)

After parliamentary committee on foreign relations supported the agreement yesterday (enabling PM Pahor to sign the deal), opposition leaders started talking about holding a referendum. Technically, it should be a cakewalk. All that would be required are 30 MPs (a third of the parliament) formally requesting the referendum. Between Janez Janša’s Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) with 28 votes, Radovan Žerjav’s Slovene People’s Party (SLS) with seven and Zmago Jelinčič’s Slovene National Party with five votes, this should really not be a problem.

However. A little birdie told pengovsky yesterday that Janez Janša is not at all keen on a referendum. Janša himself said as much later in the evening after appearing on state television and saying that it will probably come to a referendum, but as a result of a civil initiative. Which means that SDS will not chip in their 30 MPs, but will let SLS and SNS collect 40.000 signatures needed to hold a consecutive referendum on ratification of the Pahor-Kosor agreement.

Why is that? We’ve touched upon the answer in yesterday’s post. By signing the agreement PM Pahor basically put all of his eggs in one basket, crucially exposing himself and (by extension) his coalition. Should the agreement fail one way or the other, he will probably have to resign. Janša obviously sensed that and is doing plenty to make this happen. However. As former PM and having been humiliated by former Croatian PM Ivo Sanader on the border issue (Ivo Sanader famously cajoling him into accepting international law as the sole point of reference in solving the dispute), Janša knows perfectly well just how fantastically complicated a quagmire this border dispute actually is. So Janša is looking to bring down the government by beating Pahor over his head by repeating incessantly just how bad this agreement is, but stopping short of shooting down the agreement itself, hoping that SLS and SNS will do the dirty work for him.

The nationalist are in this probably just for fun, because their “postmodern” politics allows them to quicky adopt a new political platform, which does not necessarily correspond with anything they’ve advocated to date. All they need is an unoccupied political niche which will bring enough votes. If the dispute is solved, my bet is that they will either run on a platform of protecting Slovenian minorities in neighbouring states or start advocating some far fetched “solution” for the economic crisis.

As we noted yesterday, SLS is following its own agenda, which is basically very simple. Solving the border dispute would deprive them of a big part of their political platform, so it is in their vital interest that the agreement does not come to fruition. Basically, they’re fighting for survival. And this is where it gets complicated, as SLS’ political demise is one the of not-so-covert mid-term goals of Janez Janša. His ambitions to be the sole political factor on the political right (the only one worth mentioning, at the very least) were nearly fulfilled in 2008 elections, where he squeezed his junior coalition partner Christian Democratic Nova Slovenija (NSi) out of the parliament. The party didn’t make the 4% cut, a fate SLS (the other Janša’s coalition partner) only narrowly avoided.

Things get an additional thrust when one takes into account the fact that municipal elections are less than a year away. Municipal (local) elections are interpreted as a mid-term measure of strength of political parties. And although people tend to read too much into them, they can have a huge psychological impact. And this time around, autumn 2010 can be a turning point for future development of political right in Slovenia.

Namely, NSi is desperate to stage a comeback. They managed to hold on to the fringes of the political arena by their fingernails by winning a single seat in this year’s European elections and are desperate for a strong showing on local level, which would give them enough base and confidence to try to re-enter parliament in 2012 (which would be a first, by the way. Until now, once a party dropped out of the parliament, it stayed there). Given the fact that their near-death experience left an unhealthy vacuum in the Christian democratic niche of the political spectrum, they actually stand a chance, since both SDS and SLS have failed to move in and fill the vacuum completely. But the question is if there’s enough space left for them (errr… right for them… errr… nevermind…)

On the other hand, Janša and his SDS will want to reassert their dominance over SLS and NSi as well as stick one up Pahor’s ass and score an all-round victory. Which is not all that unlikely a prospect given the fact that the government’s ratings are going south as it is and that a rebound is nowhere in sight. In a year’s time the Pahor-Kosor agreement will again become a hot political potato, provided Pahor survives the referendum or at the very least avoids one in the near future. By autumn 2010 Croatia will probably have finished the negotiations and the ratification process will begin. Which is the trigger for the actual arbitrage proceedings to start, which will then cue in vicious rhetoric on betrayal of national interest and that is very much likely to hurt the electoral result of Pahor’s Social Democrats and of the ruling coalition as a whole.

So, what we’re seeing today is actually a multi-way chess game with everyone playing against everyone else simultaneously. Slovenian government against Croatian government. Then we have Slovenian government against Slovenian opposition, which is aiming to destabilise the government by undermining the treaty. Then we have the three opposition parties against each other, each with its own agenda. Putting all of this together, it can start a chain-reaction which will culminate in local elections, where finally, we have the ruling coalition which will want to capitalise on their election victory and score major points in local communities as well, with the opposition looking to hurt the coalition as much as possible.

And suddenly, a year from now, we might end up with a significantly different political landscape, regardless of the fact that things looked boringly predictable only a week ago. And the Pahor-Kosor agreement signed today can be a catalyst for all of it.

Yesterday evening Croatian parliament voted to approve the arbitration agreement between Croatian PM Jadranka Kosor and her opposite number in Slovenia Borut Pahor aimed at finally solving the border dispute between the two contries. The debate in Sabor (the parliament) was fierce and Kosor had to endure a barrage of criticism and insults. She was even accussed of “premeditated high treason” (as if there’s any other kind), giving away 100 square kilometres of Croatian sea and so on ad nauseam. Kosor responded by saying that the agreement is the best possible under current conditions and that the clause 3b does not automaticlly mean direct Slovenian access to high seas. But just to be sure, she attached an unilateral statement to that effect, which she hopes will be co-signed by the Swedish EU Presidency. In the end, despite everything eighty MPs out of 134 voted in favour of the agreement.

Sabor votes on the agreement (photo: Ranko Šuvar, source)

One of the results of the vote is that we can now finally see the official text of the agreement (scroll down to page 7 for English original), specifically, the infamous clause 3b, which speaks of “Slovene junction to high seas”. But even more importantly, the document reveals (in Article 11) that the whole procedure will begin only after Croatia signs the EU accession treaty. Now, as with clause 3b, this particular stipulation is being read almost as many ways as there are people reading it (on that note, let me add that the amount of experts on English language has risen dramatically on both sides of the border in the past few days since the document was leaked).

Anyhoo. The Croatian position seems to be that Croatia will enter the arbitrage proceedings as a full member of the EU which should even the odds against Slovenia in terms of political leverage. It also believes that this is a way to avoid a possible Slovenian referendum on Croatian EU entry due to an unfavourable decision by the court. Given the fact that the EU membership process usually lasts about a year, while the court is expected to deliberate at least three years, they may well be on to something.

Thus the ball entered the Slovenian court, where the unilateral statement Croatia added to the document is making everyone nervous. PM Pahor already said that – should the Swedish presidency co-sign the Croatian statement (as per Kosor’s wishes) – the deal is off as the statement can be understood to deny Slovenian direct access to high seas and can therefore influence the interpretation of the text of the actual agreement. But as he is preparing to run the agreement by the parliamentary foreign relations committee once again, the opposition is rumoured to be preparing a motion to severely stall the process or even to call a referendum on the agreement itself.

This is in part fuelled by an opinion by former judge at the constitutional court Janez Čebulj, who days ago wrote that referendum on the arbitrage agreement should be held before the two PMs sign it and not after the deed. Now, one can say that Čebulj’s opinion is biased and politically motivated. After all, he is known to be on good terms with the political right and rumour had it that he on more than one occasion leaked information on politically sensitive issues to SDS before the Court’s final rulings. However, on the whole he was a good constitutional judge, much better than many people are willing to admit. Therefore his opinion carries weight. PM Pahor and the coalition will have to present good arguments against holding a referendum at this junction (pun very much intended)

On the other hand, it has to be said that the opposition, specifically, Janez Janša of SDS, Radovan Žerjav of SLS and Zmago Jelinčič of SNS probably have ulterior motives for shooting down the agreement. This is a very tricky moment for the government as well as for PM Pahor personally. If he fails, his credibility will have been damaged the field of foreign relations, the only area where he indisputably knows where his towel is. So, shooting down the agreement basically means shooting down Pahor and forcing him to resign from office. Or, at the very least, making him extremely docile.

Also, resolving the border dispute would deprive the current opposition of a big part of their political platform and – as a result – of their electorate. Curiously enough, this would least affect Jelinčič’s nationalist party, as their platform shifts to accommodate an untapped source of votes (being strongly nationalistic in 1992 and 1996, they campaigned on a pro-Serb, anti-NATO platform in 2000). Lack of Slovene-Croat border dispute would damage Žerjav’s Slovene People’s Party (SLS) as the dispute is more or less their raison d’etre, but it would also make dent Janša’s ratings, although not by much.

So, there are a few ways how this could still go wrong. We’ll see later today how things turn out. A Cabinet session is due to start in about 15 minutes, after which parliamentary committees on foreign and EU relations will convene in a special session and debate the issue.

However, the opposition can use its 30+ votes to call a subsequent referendum only after the agreement is ratified in the parliament (presumably mid-December). If they wanted to hold a conslutative referendum, they’d have to convince a majority of MPs, which is not likely to happen any time soon. The bottom line therefore is, that the referendum is most likely to be held some time in early 2010. Unless of course someone devises a smart way of avoiding it altogether.

For a brief moment yesterday evening it seemed that a consensus was reached in Croatian politics on the arbitrage agreement with Slovenia. At about seven o’clock, just in time for prime time news, Croatian media started making noises about an emergency cabinet meeting convened by Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor. The news was all the more melodramatic as a scheduled cabinet meeting had already taken place earlier in the day.

Croatian opposition leader Zoran Milanović (SDP) explaining why he opposes the Pahor-Kosor agreement (source)

It turned out that following Monday’s visit of her Slovenian counterpart Borut Pahor in Zagreb, Kosor held coalition talks where the agreement apparently got the reluctant nod. According to various accounts in Croatian media she then proceeded to see how things stand with the opposition and apparently things were looking good as she convened an evening meeting with leaders of all parliamentary parties which was to be followed by a cabinet meeting, where the government would formally approve the agreement, allowing Kosor to sign it perhaps as early as today, while she is visiting Brussels.

Unfortunately, the consensus (if there ever was any) fell apart as Social Democrats, the main opposition party led by Zoran Milanović apparently still had misgivings about the wording of the agreement. Specifically, they are bothered by the stipulation that the arbitrage tribunal will decide on Slovenian junction (or contact) with high seas. Incidentally, this is precisely the point which bothers opposition in Slovenia as well. At any rate, the lack of support by SDP meant that Kosor does not have the required 2/3 majority she needs to carry the motion in the parliament. As a result, negotiations in Croatia will apparently continue on Friday.

Coming this close to a solution naturally fuelled speculation about what exactly happened that allowed this sudden (if not entirely successful) push forward. Obviously Pahor’s visit to Zagreb did bear fruit, contrary to what leader of Slovenian opposition Janez Janša said on Tuesday. Jadranka Kosor herself said yesterday after cancelling the cabinet meeting that Slovenia might very well re-invoke the blockade if the agreement is not passed. On the other hand it seems that SDP’s Zoran Milovanović was nudged a bit closer to supporting the agreement, since he was at least willing to talk it over, something he apparently refused to do until now. This may or may not have to do with the fact that Slovene PM Borut Pahor (who just happens to be Milanović’s social democratic brother-in-arms) paid him a visit after meeting Kosor on Monday.

Since the stick rarely works without the carrot, it seems logical (although entirely unsubstantiated by as much as a shred of evidence) that Pahor tried to sweeten the deal as well. Croatian media speculate (and Slovenian media is happily following suit) that Pahor offered to settle claims Croatian citizens have against Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), which are the result of Slovenian restructuring of the banking sector in mid-nineties and which amount to several hundred million euros. Until now Slovenia claimed that these claims are to be solved within the framework of Yugoslav succession treaty, but – if media speculation is correct – there is a possibility of a quid pro quo on both issues. On the other hand, this could be just a ploy to undermine what was achieved, since this sweetener could easly be interpreted as a sell-out, as “money-for-territory” which would be tantamount to high treason. Not that these charges are limited to Croatia. Only today Slovenian PM Pahor was accused of high treason by Mlada Slovenia, youth organisation of far-right Nova Slovenija.

At any rate, more will be known on Friday, when negotiations in Croatia will continue. But fact of the matter is that the longer they take, the smaller the chances are for a consensus in Croatian politics. Obviously the same goes for Slovenian politics as well.

Speculation is rife about what exactly is written in the Pahor-Kosor agreement. In case you forgot, prime ministers of Slovenia and Croatia Borut Pahor and Jadranka Kosor agreed on an as-yet-undisclosed text of an “agreement of arbitrage” which is to serve as a roadmap to solve the border issue between the two countries. Since the word of the day is “silent diplomacy” the details of the agreement are kept secret. While this initially had some positive effect, it is now starting to work against the possibility of actually reaching a solution.

Borut Pahor and Jadranka Kosor. No matching clothes this time around (source)

Initially the two sides gained valuable wiggle-room keeping the lid on details of the text. This presumably allowed both governments to work out as many details as possible, without being pinned to the wall by the opposition (even within their own respective coalitions and/or parties). But since both countries claim to be parliamentary democracies, elected representatives of the people had to be included at some point. And it is only right that they should be. It’s called a system of checks and balances. However, at that particular moment the dangerous game of chess between Ljubljana and Zagreb becomes infinitely more complicated and requires playing multiple boards at once. Think 3-D chess from Star Trek.

Bear in mind that neither PM’s political position is not particularly strong. Borut Pahor is facing a rapidly disintegrating economy, ratings that going south even faster than the economy and a multitude of coalition problems which the opposition is obviously quick to take advantage of. Fact of the matter is that Slovenian politics has again turned into a myriad of under-the-belt punches and counter-punches. If the first few months of Pahor’s government were marked by punches being thrown between coalition members (think Ultra Affair and Veselinovič Standoff) the last couple of weeks are marked by heavy barrage between the government and the opposition (the sole exception being DeSUS, the pensioner’s party which is still trying to shoot itself on both knees).

The opposition (specifically, Janez Janša’s SDS) is busting the government’s ass over a series of budget rebalancing measures, failing economy, presumably ineffective measures to kick-start growth (lower the taxes! they say. Spend less!) and allegedly breaking the election promise not to start recalling CEOs and supervisors in state-own companies who were appointed by the previous government. In effect, the opposition is calling the government inept and hell-bent on keeping power at all costs, while Rome burns.

On the other hand the government (specifically, PM Boru Pahor) appears to be reeling from the blow of winning the elections and is trying to do something. As his and his government’s ratings are taking a dive, PM Pahor apparently decided to offset that by going for the holy grail (solving the border dispute with Croatia) while the opposition is suddenly facing charges of corruption. Branko Marinič, one of SDS’s MPs apparently “forgot” to pay maintenance costs for the parliament-owned flat he lives in while serving as MP. In all honesty, it doesn’t amount to much (less than 3k euros over a period of a couple of years), but it doesn’t look good due to the fact that he receives a big fat salary ever month and the fact that he is (how embarrassing) the head of parliamentary anti-corruption committee. The same Branko Marinič was accused months earlier of having someone else take a German test in his name at Kranj Faculty where he was completing his education. Although harmless in the long run, stories like these are rather inconvenient for Janez Janša and his SDS which is why the coalition is beating them over their heads with them. The real worry for Janez Janša is the Patria Affair, which apparently rattled his cage pretty hard, because he immediately launched a counter-offensive, part of which are also attempts to undermine the fragile consensus PM Pahor is trying to build around the arbitrage agreement with Jadranka Kosor.

The top chick in Croatian politics has her own set of problems at the moment, chief among them being that lingering doubt in her ability to lead – both her party (right-wing HDZ) and the country. This includes allegations that she is flirting with Pahor. Then there are added “bonuses” of rampant corruption and other yummy stuff one came to expect of a Balkan country in a transition period, not to mention the repeated lack of enthusiasm in cooperating with the Hague tribunal and you can see that once Slovenia lifted the blockade of Croatian EU negotiations the government in Zagreb lost immediate interest in solving the issue. Jadranka Kosor simply can not afford to open another battlefield on the home front. Not to mention the fact that Croatia is in the middle of a hot presidential race.

And this is where we get back to Slovenia. All of the above is a matter of public record. What is not publicly known are actual stipulations of the agreement. Both Pahor and Kosor have alluded to them broadly, with Pahor immediately starting to take flak over it. This only intensified after he had circulated the agreement amongst members of the parliamentary foreign and EU affairs committees who started leaking information about the content of the document left and right. Not the entire document, you see. Only parts of it. Naturally, those parts which serve the leaker’s particular interests.

In Slovenia most leaks were oriented into proving the document is damaging Slovenian vital interests. This prompted a series of harsh and high profile criticisms, most notably by France Bučar, former president of the parliament and “father” of Slovene constitution, who wrote that if he it were up to him he would have never signed the treaty which in effect cedes territory which is Slovenian beyond doubt. Bučar’s opinion caught a lot of interest, not only because of the man’s stature and reputation, but because he was known for not jumping the gun and often dismissing as trivial things which at the time seemed of great importance. So, his opinion carries weight.

Opinion of Marko Pavliha, an expert on maritime law, former transportation minister and a man generally thought to be supportive of the government goes along Bučar’s lines although it is much less lucid in making its point. The same goes for the opinion of Miro Cerar, the TV-savy legal expert who mostly advises the parliamentary legal service, who wrote that the agreement is hurting Slovenia and that the government played its hand extremely poorly.

On the other side of the border, however, Vesna Pusić, leader of Croatian Liberal Democrats (as well as heir presidential candidate), said that the content of the agreement was intimated to her by a source in Slovenia and that the document is a step back in protecting Croatian interests. Namely, contrary to Pahor, Kosor did not circulate the document among Croatian MPs, who – apparently resorting to their own devices – decided the agreement is hurting Croatian national interest. PM Pahor presumably tried to convince at least some of them to the contrary. Yesterday he visited Jadranka Kosor in Zagreb, but then met with his brother in leader of Croatian Social Democrats Zoran Milanović. Neither was available for comment after the meeting and this prompted even more speculation about what (if anything) Pahor achieved in Zagreb.

Which again brings us back to Slovenia, where Janez Janša said yesterday evening that lack of progress is a good thing, since Slovenian vital interests (i.e.: direct access to high seas) are not at all protected in the agreement.

They say that a country’s foreign policy is only an extension of its home policy. But in this case it is the other way around. We are witnessing a text-book information campaign, which is already bearing fruit. The leaks were carefully placed to incite negative reactions to the agreement and then sources of the leaks will quote those negative reactions as proof of the document being even worse than originally suspected.

It would be safe to assume that if the document really bordered on high treason, it would have been leaked to the media long ago by either side. So, bearing in mind that not a single person, who extensively criticises the agreement, actually saw the entire document, while those who did see it, do not venture beyond broad criticism, leads to only one conclusion. That most political parties on both sides of the border see the agreement as an inherent danger not to their respective countries’ vital interests, but to their own political agendas as they stand to lose an extremely good rallying point.